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The earned income tax credit (EITC), which uses the federal income tax system to
provide an earnings subsidy to low-income workers, has enjoyed support across the polit-
ical spectrum as a "pro-work, pro-family" alternative to traditional welfare programs. Ad-
vocates of the EITC also claim that the EITC's tax-based administration is cheaper and
less stigmatizing than traditional welfare administration. In this Article, Professor Alstott
argues that the case for the EITC has been oversimplified in two significant ways. First,
the Article argues that both advocates and opponents of the EITC place undue emphasis
on whether it discourages work and marriage among EITC recipients. Professor Alstott
demonstrates that the conventional policy debate over the EITC's behavioral incentives is
too narrowly framed: the debate relies on incomplete economic analysis and reflects im-
portant but unacknowledged normative tensions. Second, the Article shows that the
EITC, as a tax-based income-transfer program, faces inherent institutional constraints not
present in traditional welfare programs. Professor Alstott explains that, although econo-
mists and policy analysts have long advocated integration of the tax and transfer systems,
they have overlooked the problems of inaccuracy, unresponsiveness, and noncompliance
that are inherent in tax-based administration. The Article goes on to demonstrate that,
although reforms might improve the EITC's performance along these dimensions, such
improvements would require either compromising the benefits of tax-based administration
or undertaking a major restructuring of basic institutions of the federal tax system. Pro-
fessor Alstott concludes that, absent such changes, the EITC and similar tax-based trans-
fers are likely to prove widely acceptable only if we radically revise our expectations
about accuracy, responsiveness, and compliance.
I. INTRODUCTION
T he federal earned income tax credit (EITC), which provides cashpayments to low-income workers, has recently assumed a central
role in U.S. social welfare policy. Under legislation enacted in 1993,1
by 1997 the EITC will pay annual aggregate benefits as large as those
paid under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the na-
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1 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 312,
433-35 (1993) (codified at I.R.C. § 32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
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tion's principal cash welfare program. 2 The 1993 expansion of the
EITC is a key feature of President Clinton's plan for welfare reform.3
Although the EITC is styled a "refundable tax credit," in fact it is
a kind of welfare program - or, in economists' terms, an income-
transfer program. It uses the rules and procedures of the federal in-
come tax system to make payments to low-income workers based on
their earnings and total income. As a refundable tax credit, the EITC
not only reduces or eliminates federal income tax liability, but also
pays cash to low-income taxpayers whose EITC exceeds the tax they
owe.4
For many years, the EITC was a relatively small program, viewed
principally as a means of offsetting the adverse distributional and in-
centive effects of federal income and payroll taxes on low-income
workers. In recent years, however, the EITC's advocates have in-
creasingly promoted the EITC as a solution to two central and recur-
ring concerns of welfare policy. First, proponents claim, the EITC
promotes work and family responsibility among the poor, unlike tradi-
. tional welfare programs, which have long attracted criticism for their
putative effects on work and family structure. Second, advocates ar-
gue, because the EITC is part of the federal tax system, it is simpler
and cheaper to administer than programs run by the welfare bureauc-
racy and affords greater dignity and privacy to beneficiaries.
A close examination of the two central claims made for the EITC
reveals that the EITC is neither the radical departure from welfare
that its advocates claim, nor the duplicate of welfare that its oppo-
nents depict. In this Article, I argue that current debates over the
EITC are seriously incomplete in two ways. First, both advocates and
opponents of the program give undue weight to its potential effects on
work and marriage among EITC recipients. The EITC's advocates
exaggerate the program's effectiveness in encouraging work. Oppo-
nents emphasize the program's potential work disincentives, arguing
that the EITC is welfare allover again. This conventional debate is
too narrowly framed. It relies on an incomplete economic analysis and
reflects important but unacknowledged normative tensions. Debates
over the EITC's effects on marriage are also flawed: they typically
2 For fiscal year 1997, the projected total benefits to be paid under the EITC are $25-4
billion, and projected total federal and state benefits to be paid under AFDC are just under $24.8
billion, exclusive of administrative costs. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG.,
2D SESS., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1994 GREEN BOOK 389, 678 (Comm. Print
1994) [hereinafter 1994 GREEN BOOK].
3 See Transcript of President Clinton's Message on the State of the Union, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1994, at A16 [hereinafter State of the Union].
4 EITC recipients receive cash to the extent that their EITC benefit exceeds the federal in-
come tax they owe. The bulk of EITC benefits are paid in cash. About $21.3 billion of the $25.4
billion in projected EITC benefits for fiscal year 1997, for example, will be cash payments rather
than offsets to federal income taxes. See 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 678.
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lack empirical foundation and ignore important realities of institu-
tional design.
Second, both proponents and opponents of the EITC have over-
looked the important point that, because the EITC is a tax-based
transfer program, it faces significant institutional constraints that are
not present in traditional welfare programs. Tax-based transfer pro-
grams may be cheaper and less stigmatizing than welfare, although
advocates typically assert these claims without empirical support.
Nevertheless, this Article shows that the tax system's limitations
render the EITC inherently inaccurate, unresponsive, and vulnerable
to fraud and error in ways that traditional welfare programs are not.
More empirical evidence is needed to evaluate the magnitude of these
structural flaws and to make a quantitative comparison of tax-based
and traditional programs. The central point, however, is that improv-
ing the performance of the EITC or other tax-based transfer programs
requires either compromising the benefits of tax-based administration
or undertaking a major restructuring of basic institutions of the fed-
eral tax system. Absent large-scale (and politically unlikely) reform of
the federal income tax, the EITC and similar tax-based transfer pro-
grams are likely to prove acceptable only if we radically revise our
expectations about accuracy, responsiveness, and compliance in in-
come-transfer programs.5
This second point is particularly important because the prospect of
a unified tax-transfer system has fascinated economists and other pub-
lic policy analysts at least since discussions of the negative income tax
in the 1960s.6 This Article challenges the simple case for integrating
the tax and transfer systems by showing the institutional dilemmas in-
herent in such an approach. Ultimately, this analysis suggests greater
tolerance of separate tax and transfer systems. Although the different
rules of the tax and welfare systems reflect a complex set of political
choices made over time,. at least some of the existing institutional vari-
ations permit the two systems to tailor their administrative structures
to emphasize different policy objectives, and that flexibility would be
compromised in an integrated tax and transfer system. A more sophis-
5 This Article builds on important scholarship from the 1960s and early 1970S on administra-
tion of the negative income tax. See infra note 130. Those scholars concentrated principally on
devising concrete rules and procedures to minimize problems of accuracy and responsiveness in
the negative income tax standing alone. This Article shows how similar concerns arise in ad-
ministering the EITC, which differs in significant ways from the negative income tax. Further,
this Article argues that the EITC illustrates a basic dilemma of tax-transfer integration: reforms
intended to improve accuracy, responsiveness, or compliance necessarily conflict with the goals of
tax-transfer integration.
6 See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191-93 (1962); CHRISTOPHER
GREEN, NEGATIVE TAXES AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM 160-76 (1967).
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ticated approach to tax-transfer integration would consider alternative
ways to combine the separate strengths of the two systems.7
This Article uses a study of the EITC to illustrate some of the core
dilemmas of income redistribution through tax-based transfer pro-
grams. It is the first step in my larger project of elaborating a legal
policy framework for comparing and evaluating alternative income-
transfer policies, both within and outside the tax system. My analysis
seeks to situate tax-based transfer programs in the appropriate context
- as one of many alternatives for implementing social welfare policy.
The central task of the project is to examine carefully the institutional
characteristics of tax-based transfers, in order to identify the inevitable
trade offs in institutional design that require difficult compromises
among competing goals and, ultimately, to develop a normative frame-
work for determining how those compromises can best be made.
II. THE CASE FOR THE EITC AS WELFARE REFORM
In one respect, the EITC represents an important liberalization of
American social welfare policy. The EITC embodies a recognition
that hard work may not lift a family out of poverty when wages are
low and that the working poor as well as the nonworking poor need
and deserve income transfers to support their families. 8 Traditional
welfare programs provide little aid to the working poor. Categorical
eligibility restrictions exclude many families, and high benefit reduc-
tion rates quickly deny benefits even to workers with low earnings.9
In contrast, the EITC has grown in recent years to provide substantial
levels of assistance to the working poor. IO Table 1 documents the
EITC's growth since its enactment in 1975.
7 This Article seeks to point out some of the shortcomings in conventional comparisons be-
tween the EITC and alternative programs, but providing a comprehensive comparative evalua-
tion of alternative programs is beyond the scope of this Article.
8 See, e.g., DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 81-104 (1988); ISAAC SHAPIRO & ROBERT
GREENSTEIN, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, MAKING WORK PAY: THE UNFIN-
ISHED AGENDA 3-17 (1993). In 1991, 9.2 million workers (2.1 million of whom worked full-time,
year round) were poor under the official federal definition of poverty, and 5.5 million people were
members of poor families with children that included a full-time, year-round worker. See U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Brief Overview of EITC, Aug. 19, 1993 (press release), repro-
duced in 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 174-120, Aug. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
Taxtxt File. For a striking anecdotal account of economic hardship among the working poor, see
Tony Horwitz, The Working Poor: Minimum-Wage Jobs Give Many Americans Only a Miserable
Life, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1993, at AI.
9 See SAR A. LEVITAN & ISAAC SHAPIRO, WORKING BUT POOR 98-106 (1987).
10 By calendar year 1996, the EITC will provide tax credits or cash benefits of up to $3370
per year in 1994 dollars. See I.R.C. § 32(b) (Supp. V 1993) (providing for a "credit percentage" of
40% and a maximum "earned income amount" of $8425). About 2I million families are expected
to be eligible for the credit in 1996. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF OBRA-93, at 8-10 (1994) [hereinafter CBO]. The pro-
gram's total annual cost in fiscal year 1997 will exceed $25 billion, see 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra
note 2, at 678, which will be approximately 13 times the (nominal-dollar) 1986 cost of the pro-
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Earnings Maximum Income
Year Subsidy Rate Credit Cutoff
1975 10% $ 400 $ 8,000
1980 10% $ 500 $ 10,000
1985 11 % $ 5S0 $ 11,000
1988 14% $ 874 $ 18,576
1994 30% $ 2528 $ 25,300
1996* 40% $ 3370 $ 27,000
Source: 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 700 (giving EITC for families with two or more
children).
* The 1996 figures show the fully-phased-in effects of the 1993 amendments to the EITC. All
figures are in nominal dollars, except that the EITC benefit and income cutoff for 1996 are stated
in 1994 dollars. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
The case for the EITC, however, reflects the uneasy state of cur-
rent welfare politics, in which the EITC's redistributive function is
cloaked in anti-welfare rhetoric to attract maximum political sup-
port. ll This strategy could potentially turn anti-welfare sentiment to
political advantage, but it is also risky. Promoting the EITC as the
answer to the problems of welfare feeds inflated expectations about
the capabilities of redistributive programs and reinforces negative atti-
tudes about welfare that, in the long run, may jeopardize the cause of
the EITC and of poverty relief more generally. Recent attacks on the
EITC that condemn it as "welfare" and as a "handout" suggest that
this danger is more than theoretical. 12
Thus far, the EITC has found a secure niche in welfare policy by
responding to two strong themes in current debates: a bipartisan con-
sensus on work-based welfare reform and widespread dissatisfaction
with traditional welfare administration. One familiar critique of wel-
fare is that it allows and encourages recipients to violate important
norms of individual responsibility. Critics argue that, by providing a
guaranteed minimum income and sharply reducing benefits in re-
sponse to any earnings, the welfare system discourages work and mar-
riage and prevents the poor from accumulating the work experience
gram, see HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1030 CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLE-
MENT PROGRAMS: 1993 GREEN BOOK 1058 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter 1993 GREEN BOOK].
11 See infra p. 539. A similar strategy linking work and benefits underlies the success of
Social Security. Social Security's redistributive effects have been obscured by the promotion of
the program as one in which each person gets only the benefits he or she has "earned." See JOEL
F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY 97-100 (1991);
C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST CEN-
TURY 23 (1994).
12 See James Bovard, Clinton's Biggest Welfare F-raud, WALL ST. ]., May 10, 1994, at A18;
see also Paul C. Roberts, Revenge of the Unheards ... Rising; Clinton's Deception, WASH. TIMES,
May 27, 1993, at GI (calling the EITC "a program that pays taxpayer dollars to people who don't
even earn enough to be taxpayers".
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that would improve their prospects over the long term. 13 Another
common criticism is that the current welfare system is miserly, stigma-
tizing, and uneven in coverage - that it rewards the "dependent" poor
but provides too little assistance to the working poor. 14 These views
reflect widely varying normative premises and support different policy
prescriptions. Dismantling or reducing the size of the welfare system
is one option;15 another is to continue to provide welfare but with
strict work requirements;16 still another is to expand the government's
role in job training and, if necessary, to provide guaranteed jobs to the
poor. 17 Nevertheless, there is an apparent political consensus in sup-
port of reforms that in some way link welfare and work. 18 The Fam-
ily Support Act of 1988,19 which mandates job-training programs
intended to increase work among welfare recipients, reflects this con-
sensus.20 The Clinton administration's 1994 proposals, which would
transform welfare gradually into a program of mandatory work, evoke
similar themes. 21
13 See generally LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT 4 (1986) (arguing that welfare
recipients should be required to work to encourage them to "function"); LAWRENCE M. MEAD,
THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY 13 (1992) [hereinafter MEAD, NEW POLITICS] (arguing that
work is essential to enable the poor to become "functioning citizens"); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND 154-66 (1984) (arguing that increases in welfare benefits from 1960 to 1970 discouraged
work and marriage). For critiques of Mead's and Murray's works, see CHRISTOPHER JENCKS,
RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 70-91 (1992); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 157-65
(1989); WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 159-63 (1987); and Sara McLanahan,
Glen Cain, Michael Olneck, Irving Piliavin, Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, Are We Losing
Ground?, Focus, Fall & Winter 1985, at 1, 1-12. Joel Handler and Yeheskel Hasenfeld argue
that work has always been of central importance in American welfare policy's moral distinction
between the deserving and undeserving poor. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note I I, at 16.
14 See ELLWOOD, supra note 8, at 25, 98-104.
15 See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 13, at 25, 98-104.
16 See, e.g., MEAD, NEW POLITICS, supra note 13, at 166-84.
17 See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 8, at 238. For richer evaluations of the current welfare
debate, consult HANDLER & HASENFELD, cited above in note I I, at 170-200, 230-4 I ; KATZ, cited
above in note 13, at 3-8, 236-39; and Frances F. Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The Contemporary
Relief Debate, in THE MEAN SEASON: THE ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE 45, 92-101 (Fred
Block, Richard A. Cloward, Barbara Ehrenreich & Frances F. Piven eds., 1987).
18 See, e.g., Sheldon Danziger, Fighting Poverty and Reducing Welfare Dependency, in WEL-
FARE POLICY FOR THE 1990s, at 41, 41-42 (Phoebe H. Cottingham & David T. Ellwood eds.,
1989). However, this consensus is not seamless. See Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 516-18 (1987-88).
19 Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 201, 102 Stat. 2343, 2356-60 (1988)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988»; 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 337-59.
20 See Handler, supra note 18, at 458-59.
21 Very generally, the Clinton program would limit welfare receipt to two years. See S. 2224,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 104, reprinted in 140 CONGo REC. S7274 (daily ed. June 21, 1994); 140
CONGo REc. S7322 (explaining the time limit). During that period, welfare recipients would par-
ticipate in government-funded programs including education, job training, and job search. See S.
2224, supra, § 102, reprinted in 140 CONGo REC. S7274 .(daily ed. June 21, 1994); 140 CONGo REC.
S7323-24 (outlining these programs). At the end of that period, welfare recipients would be ex-
pected to work, and those recipients who could not find employment on their own would be
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In the current political climate, then, work and responsibility are
"in" and traditional welfare is "out." It may appear to those commit-
ted to providing public assistance that there is little to lose - and
much to gain for the poor - by promoting the EITC as the "pro
work" and "pro family"22 solution to welfare's perceived disincentives
and administrative failures. David Ellwood, formerly of Harvard's
Kennedy School of Government and now Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, described the EITC this
way:
The EITC helps the working poor while mainly avoiding the conun-
drums [of welfare]. The rewards of work are increased, not dimin-
ished. . . . People are helped without any need of a stigmatizing,
invasive, and often degrading welfare system, and their autonomy is in-
creased, not decreased. Since it truly would be part of the tax system
(unlike the badly named negative income tax, which really was welfare
all over again), people would not be isolated. 23
Political speeches advocating the EITC also adopt a strong anti-wel-
fare theme. In his 1994 State of the Union message, for example, Pres-
ident Clinton argued that the 1993 expansion of the EITC "reward[s]
work over welfare .... Now that's real welfare reform."24 Congres-
sional proponents of the program emphasized in 1993 that the EITC
"is the furthest thing from a handout"25 and "is not welfare, by any
means."26
Some commentators oppose work requirements in welfare pro-
grams on the grounds that mandatory work (or "workfare'') programs
are more expensive, less effective, and harsher than voluntary work
provided a guaranteed job. See S. 2224, supra, § 201, reprinted in 140 CONG.REC. S7275-77
(daily ed. June 21, 1994); 140 CONGo REC. S7326-27 (explaining the work guarantee facet). The
plan relies on the EITC to supplement the wages of low-income workers other than those who
hold government-provided jobs. See S. 2224, supra, § 207, reprinted in 140 CONGo REC. S7281
(daily ed. June 21, 1994); 140 CONGo REC. S7319 (noting the interaction between the EITC and
the welfare reform proposal). The Clinton plan is similar to David Ellwood's proposals in Poor
Support. See ELLWOOD, supra note 8, at 238. Republican proposals to limit or eliminate welfare
also emphasize work for welfare recipients. See Jason DeParle, Momentum Builds for Cutting
Back Welfare System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at 1.
22 This was a favorite slogan of EITC supporters during debates over the 1993 budget legisla-
tion that expanded the EITC. See, e.g., 139 CONGo REC. H5532 (daily ed. July 30, 1993) (state-
ment of Rep. Richardson) ("[T]he EITC is pro-work because, unlike other forms of assistance to
the poor, only those who work and have earnings can receive benefits.... The EITC is pro-
family because it is available only to families that stay with their children and their [sic] is no
discrimination against two-parent families."); see also SHAPIRO & GREENSTEIN, supra note 8, at
vii ("The EITC is often described as 'pro-work' and 'pro-family.''').
23 ELLWOOD, supra note 8, at 115.
24 State of the Union, supra note 3, at A16.
25 139 CONGo REC. H5504 (daily ed. July 29, 1993) (statement of Rep. Price).
26 Id. at H5503 (daily ed. July 29, 1993) (statement of Rep. Wise). Similar themes have been
evident throughout the EITC's history. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1978); S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439,
3554; S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. I I (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 54, 63-64.
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programs.27 But the EITC, unlike workfare, has no mandatory work
feature. It provides income transfers to people who choose to work,
and it does not deny current welfare benefits to nonworkers. Thus,
some opponents of mandatory work requirements in welfare programs
do not criticize the EITC.28 The EITC has also garnered additional
political support as a program of tax relief29 and even child care,30
which appeal to political constituencies that may not be concerned
with welfare reform per see
How does the EITC achieve its ostensible advantages over wel-
fare? The EITC is a complex hybrid of an earnings subsidy, a tradi-
tional income-transfer program, and a tax credit program.31
Understanding these features and the tensions they create lays the
groundwork for the subsequent analysis of the EITC's effects on be-
havior and its institutional limitations.
Traditional income transfers provide a useful benchmark for com-
prehending the EITC. A traditional income-transfer program that
tailors benefits to need pays the largest benefits to families with the
lowest incomes and reduces benefits as income rises. Thus, a family
27 See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note II, at 231.
28 See id. at 159-60.
29 Between 1975 and 1986, the EITC's role as an offset to the economic burden on low-
income workers of the growing Social Security payroll tax helped to justify several increases in
the credit. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1986); S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 119 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3554; H.R. REP. No. 19, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 29 (1975). In the early 1990S, deficit reduction legislation relied on expansions of the EITC
to head off opposition to regressive tax increases. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE
178-79 (1992); cf Selected Aspects of Welfare Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures and Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. of Ways and Means,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Welfare Reform Hearings] (statement of Samuel
Y. Sessions, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Dep't of the Treasury) (noting that a pro-
posed increase in the EITC would help offset the impact on low income families of a proposed
energy tax). Changes in the tax law, but not in transfer programs, are taken into account in
determining the distributional effect of a tax bill. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., METHODOLOGY AND ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN THE DIS-
TRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS 2 (Comm. Print 1993). This convention may enhance the EITC's
political appeal, because an EITC increase appears in the distribution tables as an offset to re-
gressive tax increases, but an increase in AFDC benefits, for example, does not.
30 In the late 1980s and early 1990S, the Bush administration promoted an increase in the
EITC as a way to finance child care for low-income workers. See Statement on Proposed Child-
Care Legislation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 240-41 (1989). Members of Congress also touted the EITC as a
program that eased the burden of child care. See 135 CONGo REC. E3387 (daily ed. Oct. 1I, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Kolbe); id. at H3950 (daily ed. July 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Petri).
31 In 1969, the Nixon administration proposed a negative income tax, the Family Assistance
Plan (FAP). See H.R. 14173, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Congressional concern about the poten-
tial work disincentive effect of such a program helped defeat the bill. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN,
THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 458-83 (1973). These concerns helped to motivate the
EITC's hybrid earnings-subsidy/income-transfer structure. See S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. II (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 54,63-64. The EITC was introduced as a "work
bonus program" in 1972. H.R. I, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §534 (1971). It was enacted in 1975. See
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30-32 (1975) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993».
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with $5000 of outside income typically receives smaller income-transfer
benefits than a family of the same size with no outside income. As
outside income increases, benefits fall, and at some level of income -
the income cutoff point - benefits fall to zero.32 The reduction in
benefits as income rises can be termed the "income test."
The EITC produces a pattern of benefits that at first seems en-
tirely different.33 For workers with earnings and total income between
one dollar and $8425, the EITC provides an earnings subsidy equal to
an extra forty cents for every dollar of earnings.34 In this income
range, the EITC appears to be a "backwards" income-transfer pro-
gram, because it provides greater dollar benefits to those with higher
earnings and no benefits at all to those without wages, regardless of
need.
The EITC begins to tailor benefits to need through an income test
at slightly higher levels of earnings. When earnings reach $8425, the
earnings subsidy is capped.35 Above that threshold, the dollar amount
of EITC benefits remains constant up to an earnings level of $11,00036
and then is reduced by twenty-one cents for every dollar of earnings
over $11,000.37 Under this schedule, EITC benefits are reduced to
zero at $27,000 of earnings.38 Thus, between $11,000 and $27,000 in
earnings, the EITC resembles a traditional income-transfer program,
which reduces benefits as earnings increase. Table 2 and Graph 1 il-
lustrate the EITC's distinctive, pyramidal pattern of benefits for a
worker with two children. Initially, an increase in earnings results in
higher EITC benefits; as earnings increase above $8425, however, the
EITC benefit first remains constant and then declines, ultimately to
zero.39
32 See 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 214-15, 324-25, 327-29, 757.
33 Throughout the Article, unless otherwise stated, all EITC parameters apply to families with
two or more children. The EITC provides these recipients with the greatest earnings subsidy;
workers with only one child receive a somewhat smaller subsidy, and single workers receive a
much lower benefit. See I.R.C. § 32(b) (Supp. V 1993). In addition, because the 1993 legislation
phases in changes to the EITC between 1994 and 1996, see id., EITC parameters in the text are
those that apply for calendar year 1996, expressed in 1994 dollars.
34 See id. § 32(b)(I)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
35 See id. § 32(a)(I), (b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
36 See id. § 32(a)(2), (b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1994).
37 See id. § 32(a)(2), (b)(I)(A), (b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
38 At earnings of $27,000, the benefit calculated under § 32(a) and (b) is zero, because (.4 x
$8425) - [.2106 x ($27,000 - $1 I ,000)] = o. To prevent families with low earnings but significant
unearned income from claiming the EITC, the reduction in benefits is based on the higher of
earned income or adjusted gross income. See id. § 32(a)(2)(B) (1988). "Earned income" includes
virtually all forms of wages, salary, and self-employment income, including nontaxable items. See
infra note 146.
39 All tables and graphs make the simplifying assumption that total earnings ("earned in-
come," defined in I.R.C. § 32(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993» equals total income ("adjusted gross income,"
defined in I.R.C. § 62 (Supp. V. 1993».
542 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 108:533
TABLE 2: 1996 EITC BENEFITS UNDER CURRENT LAW
Earnings EITC Total Income
(= Income) Benefits (including EITC)
$ 0 $ 0 $ 0
$ 5000 $ 2000 $ 7,000
$ 8425 $ 3370 $11,795
$ 10,000 $ 3370 $13,370
$ 15,000 $ 2528 $17,528
$ 20,000 $ 1475 $21,475
$ 27,000 $ 0 $27,000
These figures reflect EITC parameters for 1996, expressed in 1994 dollars. See supra notes 33-39
and accompanying text. "Total Income" shows the sum of EITC and total (pre-tax, pre-transfer)
earnings; it excludes other transfer benefits and federal and state taxes.
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A worker may receive the EITC and other transfer payments
as well. In general, the receipt of transfer payments by an EITC
recipient does not affect the EITC benefit received.40 One way to
40 Income-tested transfer payments are not taken into account in determining adjusted gross
income for purposes of the EITC, because they are generally excluded from income under admin-
istrative rulings of the I.R.S. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-246, 1975-1 C.B. 24 (ruling that non-compen-
satory allowances to employment-program trainees are excluded from income); Rev. Rul. 71-425,
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understand the interaction of the EITC with other taxes and transfers
is to picture the EITC, other income-transfer programs, and the tax
system as creating a single integrated system that provides transfers or
collects taxes at each income level. At very low levels of income, peo-
ple may be eligible for traditional income transfers and the EITC. At
higher levels of income, the government simply imposes taxes. Graph
2 uses a hypothetical but realistic version of the U.S. tax-transfer sys-
tem to show how the EITC alters the schedule of taxes and
transfers.41
























I -f]- With EITC • Without EITC
40,000
The EITC also differs from traditional transfers in administration.
Traditional welfare programs use government workers to collect and
1971-2 C.B.76 (ruling that state welfare payments to work program participants are excluded
from income). A portion of Social Security benefits is included in income, but only for certain
recipients. See infra note 153. For purposes of AFDC, Food Stamps, and certain income-tested
housing assistance programs, the EITC is not counted as income and is not counted as resources
(assets) until the second month after the receipt of the EITC. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(7)(B)(iv),
1382a(b)(19), 1382b(a)(lo) (Supp. V 1993); I.R.C. § 32(j) (Supp. V 1993).
41 Constructing a graph that reflects precisely the numerous federal and state transfer pro-
grams and taxes is beyond the scope of this Article. The hypothetical tax-transfer system includes
the EITC, a single welfare program that roughly mimics the terms of AFDC and Food Stamps, a
payroll tax, and an income tax with progressive marginal tax rates like those of the current fed-
eral income tax. The graphs and table are based on taxes and benefits for a parent and three
children at different levels of income. The income support program provides a maximum benefit
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verify information about applicants and recipients. In contrast, the
EITC is administered through the federal income tax system as a re-
fundable tax credit. In theory, workers eligible for the EITC need
never see a bureaucratic face.42 They simply attach a special schedule
to their federal income tax returns.
The IRS awards the EITC based on the information provided in
the tax return. The EITC first offsets federal income tax liability (if
any), and the balance is refunded in cash. The unusual43 refund fea-
ture makes it possible for the EITC to provide cash benefits to work-
ers who are too poor to owe any tax or whose tax liability is less than
their EITC benefit.44 The Code allows workers to claim projected
EITC benefits from their employers throughout the year rather than
as an annual lump sum, but virtually no EITC recipients choose this
option.45
of $8250, with a benefit reduction rate of 75%. In contrast, in 1993 a family of four that received
the median state's maximum AFDC benefit and the maximum Food Stamp benefit would receive
a total annual benefit of $9720. See 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 378, 769. AFDC im-
poses a nominal benefit reduction rate of 100%, but the effective rate can vary significantly based
on allowable expenses and other rules. See ide at 327-29. The Food Stamp Program imposes a
benefit reduction rate of about 30%, although the effective rate can vary. See ide at 768. The
hypothetical income tax system does not impose taxes on a worker with three children until her
income exceeds $16,000. Thereafter, the marginal income tax rates are 15 %, 28%, 31 %, 36%, and
39.6%, beginning at income levels of $16,001, $31,001, $79,001, $128,001, and $250,001, respec-
tively. Cf. Rev. Proc. 93-49, 1993-2 C.B. 581 (announcing 1994 inflation-adjusted rate brackets
and a tax threshold of $15,400, composed of a standard deduction of $5600 and four personal
exemptions of $2450 each). The hypothetical system omits the phase-out of personal exemptions
at high income levels required by I.R.C. § 15I(d)(3) (Supp. V 1993). The hypothetical payroll tax
is eight percent capped at wages of $60,000. See OASDI Contribution and Benefit Base and the
Repeal of the Hospital Insurance Contribution Base, 1993-36 I.R.B. 39; cf. I.R.C. §.3 10I(a), (b)
(1988) (mandating a payroll tax of 7.65%, which includes a 6.2% Social Security tax and a base
for this portion of the tax capped at $60,600). In addition, the graph assumes that the family's
sole source of income is its earnings, which are subject to both income and payroll taxes.
42 But see infra note 123 (noting that a significant portion of EITC recipients participating in
a recent survey rely on paid tax preparers); infra p. 590 (questioning whether tax preparers are in
effect serving as case workers).
43 The only refundable tax credits in the Code are the EITC and credits for payments of
federal income or excise taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 31-35 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
44 For example, a single worker who earns $20,000 and has three children will be entitled to
an EITC of about $1475 beginning in 1996. See ide § 32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). At 1994 federal
income tax rates, standard deduction levels, and personal exemption levels, see ide §§ I(b), 63(C),
151 (1988); Rev. Proc. 93-49, supra note 41, her federal income tax liability is about $690. The
EITC would reduce her federal tax liability to zero, and she would receive a cash "refund" of
$785.
45 See infra p. 581.
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III. How THE EITC DEBATE OVERSTATES THE IMPORTANCE OF
BEHAVIORAL DISINCENTIVES
Conventional policy debates over the EITC, like debates over wel-
fare policy,46 are dominated by economic analyses that focus on poten-
tial disincentives for work and marriage. This Part argues that these
narrowly focused debates are analytically incomplete and reflect con-
siderable normative confusion. Although advocates of the EITC have
probably exaggerated its positive effects on labor supply, critics of the
EITC give undue weight to potential negative effects on work effort.
They rely on an "economic" analysis that departs significantly from
both the analytic conventions and the standard normative underpin-
nings of traditional economic theory. The standard criticism of the
EITC's potential disincentives for marriage proceeds without acknowl-
edging the need for empirical support and overlooks the inevitable
trade offs among competing policy goals that constrain design of the
EITC, as well as of traditional transfer programs. These dominant
debates over the EITC's behavioral effects have distorted comparisons
of alternative programs and have enshrined an apparently neutral
mode of analysis that is in fact biased against redistribution.
In the following discussion, it is essential to distinguish disincen-
tives from the effects of those disincentives on behavior. Economic
theory can establish the existence of disincentives to work or to marry,
but empirical study is needed to establish whether and how those dis-
incentives actually affect people's decisions to work or to marry. For
example, whether work disincentives actually reduce work effort de-
pends on the strength of people's preferences for work and the extra
income work generates compared to leisure or other activities. Those
preferences may be shaped by a variety of forces, including the availa-
bility of incrementally longer or shorter work hours, and family re-
sponsibilities. There is a wealth of empirical evidence on traditional
welfare programs' impact on work,47 but that evidence is both difficult
to interpret and uneven in its coverage of different types of workers.48
To be as clear as possible for all readers, and at the cost of deviating
from standard economic terminology, I will refer to "potential" disin-
centives to emphasize the tentative nature of theoretical predictions.
The argument in this Part is critical rather than prescriptive. My
goal is to reveal the analytical oversights and normative inconsisten-
cies in current policy analyses of the EITC, while remaining within
46 See Piven & Cloward, supra note 17, at 72-73.
47 See infra note 52 (citing several empirical studies on welfare's impact on work).
48. See generally ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC Eco-
NOMICS 571 (1980) (noting that the Question of the impact of income maintenance programs on
labor supply and savings is a "complicated Question, and individuals may be affected very differ-
ently"). "This variation makes it difficult to interpret the empirical evidence - even in this rela-
tively well researched area." Id.
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the framework of traditional economic analysis that both sides in the
debate purport to use. A normative evaluation of the appropriate role
of economic analysis in policy evaluation and the proper weight to be
given to the behavioral effects of the EITC and other redistributive
programs is beyond the scope of this Article, although that task forms
an important part of my long-term project.49
A. A Critical Evaluation of the Significance of Potential and
Actual Work Disincentives in the EITC
One classic dilemma of redistribution is the potential trade off be-
tween redistribution and labor supply. Redistributive programs may
decrease total economic output if they reduce work effort by income-
transfer recipients or by taxpayers who finance the program.50 Thus,
reductions in work effort raise the economic cost of redistributive pro-
grams. Even those analysts most committed to distributive justice for
the least advantaged have grappled with this economic constraint.51
Empirical studies suggest that redistributive programs on balance
probably have a small but nontrivial negative effect on work effort
and that specific transfer programs can vary in their effects, but ana-
lysts differ on the magnitude of the actual work disincentives found.52
49 Current discussions of welfare and work, for example, often fail to recognize the social
value of nonmarket work such as child care and instead characterize single mothers who receive
welfare and do not hold jobs as "deviant." See generally MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER (forthcoming 1995) (arguing that single mothers are viewed as "deviant" in poverty dis-
courses and that welfare policy rests on the normative claim that families should be supported by
male breadwinners); Carole Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND THE
WELFARE STATE 231, 231-60 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988) (arguing that American welfare policy
fails to recognize women's nonmarket work and denies women full citizenship by considering only
market work in determining the type of assistance people receive). A critical evaluation of dis-
courses about welfare and work might also question the social function of the work ethic and
punitive treatment of nonworkers. See generally HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note I I, at
11-13 (arguing that welfare systems separate poor workers from poor nonworkers to reinforce the
work ethic); Piven & Cloward, supra note 17, at 92-101 (arguing that the availability of welfare
increases the financial security of the poor by lessening the importance of the unpredictable labor
market).
50 Redistributive programs may also reduce savings. See R. Glenn Hubbard, Jonathan Skin-
ner & Stephen P. Zeldes, Why Do People Save? Expanding the Life-Cycle Model: Precautionary
Saving and Public Policy, AM. ECON. REV., May 1994, at 174, 175 (arguing that the asset-based
means testing of AFDC, Social Security Insurance (SSI), and Medicaid may significantly depress
savings by low-income households).
51 In an extreme case, redistributive programs might, through their effects on economic out-
put, make even the least advantaged worse off. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 285-86
(1971). See generally AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 137 (1992) (describing the con-
flict between aggregative and distributional considerations).
52 The general literature on the labor-supply response to income-maintenance programs is too
voluminous to cite completely. See, e.g., Sheldon Danziger, Robert Haveman & Robert Plotnick,
How Income-Transfer Programs Affect Work, Savings, and the Income Distribution: A Critical
Review, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 975, 1020 (1981) (estimating that income-transfer programs reduce total
labor supply by about 4.8% but adding that "the research findings are too varied, too uncertain,
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Contrary to EITC advocates' claims, microeconomic theory shows
that the EITC does not necessarily increase work effort among the
poor, and may actually reduce it. This Part begins by presenting the
standard, static analysis of labor supply that is commonly used to ana-
lyze the labor-supply effects of the EITC and other redistributive pro-
grams.53 Though simplified,54 this model of labor supply suffices to
show the inherent ambiguities in claims about the EITC's effects on
and themselves too colored with judgment to serve as more than a rough guide to policy
choices"); Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, 30 J. ECON.
LIT. I, 16 (1992) (arguing that AFDC generates "nontrivial" reductions in work but noting that,
"as is frequently the case, the estimates of effects vary considerably across the available studies for
reasons usually difficult to explain"); Philip K. Robins, A Comparison of the Labor Supply Find-
ings From the Four Negative Income Tax Experiments, 20 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 567, 573 (1985)
(observing that experiments found "an unambiguous decrease in labor supply" but that "in no case
is there evidence of a massive withdrawal from the labor force" and reporting that decreases in
hours worked ranged from five to twenty-five percent). Data also typically show that few recipi-
ents of AFDC work. See, e.g., 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 404 (showing that, in 1992,
only 6.4% of female adult AFDC recipients worked part-time or full-time). But see Kathleen M.
Harris, Work and Welfare Among Single Mothers in Poverty, 99 AM. J. Soc. 317, 317, 344-46
(1993) (finding that the majority of women on welfare work at some point during a spell on
welfare); Kathryn Edin & Christopher Jencks, Reforming Welfare, in RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY
204, 214-18 (Christopher Jencks ed., 1992) (finding, in a study of 50 welfare mothers, that virtu-
ally all of them work but fail to report their earnings).
53 See 1993 Welfare Reform Hearings, supra note 29, at 90-93 (testimony of Gary Burtless);
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EA&'lED INCOME TAX CREDIT: DESIGN AND ADMINISTRA-
TION COULD BE IMPROVED 45-52 (GAOIGGD-93- 145 , Sept. 1993); SAUL D. HOFFMAN & LAU-
RENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: ANTIPOVERTY EFFECTIVENESS AND
LABOR MARKET EFFECTS 39-50 (1990); Robert L. Moore, Recent Proposals to Redesign the
EITe: An Economist's Response, 59 TAX NOTES 105, 105-07 (1993).
54 First, the standard analysis implicitly assumes that workers can choose whether to work a
marginal hour. This assumption may be true in some cases, such as for a worker who can accept
or reject hours of overtime, but is probably untrue in cases in which labor-supply choices are
"lumpy." For example, a nonworker may be choosing between having no job and having a 20- or
4o-hour a week commitment, and someone already in the labor force may be able to choose only
whether to take on a second job. In the long run, the opportunities for adjustment are probably
greater than in the short run. The choices, however, may remain somewhat lumpy given the
structure of the labor market. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 53, at 45-47.
Second, decisions about work may be made jointly with other family members, or work may
be undertaken for reasons other than the wage alone - for example, work may entitle workers to
social insurance benefits or to higher levels of such benefits. For a richer discussion of these and
other determinants of labor supply, see ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, cited above in note 48, at 43-48;
and Danziger, Haveman & Plotnick, cited above in note 52, at 979-80. Third, reductions in labor
supply may have dynamic consequences not captured here. For example, income transfers may
make workers more selective in choosing jobs. Although that selectivity may reduce labor supply
in the short run, in the long run it could increase productivity if workers find better or more
stable jobs. Finally, the analysis abstracts from macroeconomic conditions, including the level of
unemployment, which affect the ability of willing workers to find jobs.
The following discussion, like most current analyses of the EITC, assumes that the economic
benefits of the EITC accrue to the recipient, and not to her employer. However, the incidence of
the EITC, like that of other subsidies, is not entirely certain. Depending on how markets adjust,
employers or even customers, rather than workers, could capture the economic benefit of the
EITC in whole or in part, if employers can identify EITC-eligible workers and reduce their
wages accordingly. See SHAPIRO & GREENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 28-29.
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work and to provide background for understanding EITC advocates'
and opponents' normative economic arguments.
The standard analysis assumes that workers and potential workers
understand how the EITC, the tax system, and the welfare system af-
fect their earnings. Because the EITC is complex, however, EITC re-
cipients may not understand the connection between work and the
EITC benefits they receive. This informational gap may blunt both
the EITC's potential incentives and its potential disincentives.55
Standard economic analysis suggests that the EITC creates com-
peting potential work incentives and disincentives that vary among
groups of workers. As Part II describes, the EITC combines three dis-
tinct elements: an earnings subsidy, a "stationary" range, and a "phase-
out" or income test. For workers with earnings in the earnings subsidy
range, the EITC acts as a proportional pay increase, which provides
up to four dollars for every ten dollars of earnings. A casual observer
might suppose that a pay raise necessarily increases work effort, but
economic theory suggests that the earnings subsidy may either increase
or decrease work by a worker who is already employed. The earnings
subsidy increases the return to work relative to other activities (for
example, leisure), and this "substitution effect" may increase people's
proclivity to work rather than to consume leisure. On the other hand,
EITC benefits provide extra money, which allows the worker to con-
sume as much as before with less work. This "income effect" may lead
the worker to consume more leisure, depending on her preferences.
The net impact on work depends on the relative magnitudes of these
competing effects.56 Importantly, however, the EITC's potential in-
centives are different for a nonworker contemplating entering the
workforce. For her, the EITC is an unambiguous potential work in-
centive; she receives no income support from the EITC unless she goes
to work and so the income effect is absent.57
In contrast, workers with incomes in the stationary range, who re-
ceive an EITC benefit that does not vary with earnings, face a poten-
55 Although more research is needed, anecdotal evidence suggests that there may be signifi-
cant confusion about the terms of the EITC. For example, the fact that the EITC is received as
a tax refund rather than throughout the year in the paycheck may blur the link between the
EITC and work. See LYNN M. OLSON WITH AUDREY DAVIS, THE EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT: VIEWS FROM THE STREET LEVEL 12-13 (Northwestern Univ. Ctr. for Urban Affairs and
Policy Research Working Paper No. 94-1, 1994).
56 A similar predictive ambiguity occurs in the analysis of an income tax, which lowers the
return to work and creates competing income and substitution effects. Once again, theory cannot
predict even the direction (let alone the magnitude) of the net effect on work effort. Empirical
studies vary in their estimate of the responsiveness of labor supply to income tax changes. See
HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 413-24 (3d ed. 1992).
57 See Moore, supra note 53, at 106 & n.9; C. Eugene Steuerle, Tax Credits for Low-Income
Workers with Children, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1990, at 201, 209. If a nonworker receives
other forms of income support, the benefit reduction rates in the other programs may offset the
EITC's potential incentive effects.
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tial work disincentive. The earnings subsidy is no longer available
with respect to extra earnings, so the EITC substitution effect neither
encourages nor discourages work relative to leisure. Further, the in-
come effect (or the feeling of being better off with less work) may dis-
courage work.58
For workers with earnings in the EITC phase-out range, additional
earnings reduce EITC benefits, just as in a traditional income-transfer
program. This incremental benefit reduction as income rises is analo-
gous to a tax on income: although the tax does not add to the govern-
ment's coffers, the worker keeps less than a dollar for each additional
dollar earned. This benefit reduction, like any actual tax, reduces the
net monetary reward for extra work. EITC recipients who also pay
income and payroll taxes or who participate in other income-transfer
programs can find that multiple marginal tax rates apply to the same
dollars of earnings, and cumulative potential work disincentives can
be quite large. For example, the EITC's benefit reduction rate is
twenty-one percent, but EITC recipients who also pay federal income
and payroll taxes face a cumulative marginal tax rate as high as forty-
four percent, without taking into account state taxes or benefit reduc-
tions in other income-transfer programs.59
Graph 3 shows the EITC's effects on marginal tax rates at differ-
ent levels of income in the hypothetical but realistic tax-transfer sys-
tem depicted in Graph 2 in Part II. At very low levels of income, the
EITC's earnings subsidy creates a negative marginal tax rate that off-
sets, at least in part, the marginal tax rates that other taxes or trans-
fers create. At slightly higher income levels, however, the EITC
increases marginal tax rates. Table 3 summarizes the total taxes,
transfers, and marginal tax rates that correspond to different levels of
income in this hypothetical system.
For workers in the EITC phase-out range, the EITC creates an
unambiguous potential work disincentive. In this income range, the
EITC's substitution effect may discourage work effort because the
phase-out of EITC benefits, like a tax, reduces the net wage. Further,
an EITC recipient in the phase-out range has a higher total income
than a worker with no EITC benefit, and thus the EITC's income
effect also may discourage work effort.60
58 See HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 53, at 41.
59 The 44% figure is comprised of a 2 I % EITC phase-out, a IS % federal income tax, and a
7.62 % Social Security payroll tax. These simple figures, however, are quite rough; estimating
actual marginal tax rates for participants in multiple programs is extremely difficult. For a simu-
lation of explicit and implicit tax rates, see Stacy Dickert, Scott Houser & John K. Scholz, Taxes
and the Poor: A Microsimulation Study of Implicit and Explicit Taxes, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 621,
62 4-36 (1994)·
60 See HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 53, at 41.
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TABLE 3: MARGINAL TAX RATES IN A HYPOTHETICAL
(BUT REALISTIC) TAX AND TRANSFER SYSTEM
Income and
Payroll Transfers Marginal Total Taxes (+) or
Income Taxes (including EITe) Tax Rate Transfers (-)
$ 1000 $ 80 $ 7900 43% - $ 7820
$ 8000 $ 640 $ 5450 43% - $ 4810
$ 10,000 $ 800 $ 4120 83% - $ 3320
$ 15,000 $ 1200 $ 2528 29% - $ 1328
$ 20,000 $ 2200 $ 1475 44% + $ 725
$ 30,000 $ 4500 $ 0 23% + $ 4500
$ 40,000 $ 7970 $ 0 36% + $ 7970
$ 61,000 $15,450 $ 0 28% + $15,450
Source: See supra note 41.
Although microeconomic theory can make limited predictions
about the EITC's potential effects on different groups of workers, only
empirical evidence can determine whether the EITC on balance en-
courages or discourages work. In theory, the EITC might do either.
Early estimates of the EITC's impact on work effort suggest that the
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EITC reduces work effort in the aggregate, but probably by a smaller
amount than do traditional welfare programs.61 These studies are
open to criticism on methodological grounds, however.62 In addition,
the 1993 changes in the EITC program may have altered the EITC's
labor-supply effects by increasing the earnings subsidy and changing
the proportion of EITC recipients in the phase-in, stationary, and
phase-out ranges.63
Although potential work disincentives are inherent in the EITC
and other income-tested transfer programs, it might appear that such
disincentives could be reduced by lowering benefit reduction rates.
The success of such changes in EITC design may be limited, however,
by two dilemmas that also constrain welfare program design. First,
reducing marginal tax rates creates difficult and politically trouble-
some trade offs. In an income-tested transfer program such as the
EITC, it is impossible simultaneously to provide generous benefits, to
keep program costs low by paying benefits only to the poor, and to
keep benefit reduction rates low.64 Reducing the marginal tax rate
means that benefits decline at a slower rate as income rises and thus
61 See id. at 43-47. The authors estimate that, in 1988, the EITC reduced the labor supply of
EITC recipients as a group by about two percent. Although workers in the earnings subsidy
range increased their work effort by about two percent, the increase was more than offset by the
reduced labor supply of higher-earning groups. See id.; see also 1993 Welfare Reform Hearings,
supra note 29, at 91 (testimony of Gary Burtless) (arguing that the EITC has a "very small" work
disincentive effect in comparison to other transfer programs); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, supra note 53, at 50-52 (estimating that, in 1988, the EITC reduced the aggregate labor
supply of EITC recipients by two percent and projecting that in 1994, under pre-1993 law, the
EITC would reduce the aggregate labor supply of EITC recipients by 3.6%). For an excellent
survey of studies of the effects of transfer programs on labor supply and the implications of the
findings for analysis of the EITC, see Stacy Dickert, Scott Houser & John K. Scholz, The Earned
Income Tax Credit and Transfer Programs: A Study of Labor Market and Program Participation,
in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY I, 3-17 Games M. Poterba ed., 1994), reprinted in 94 TAX
NOTES TODAY 222-62 (Nov. 22, 1994).
62 See, e.g., John K. Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance, and
Antipoverty Effectiveness, 47 NAT'L TAX]. 63, 78-79 (1994); Steuerle, supra note 57, at 209. In
addition, these studies measure only increases or decreases in hours of work by EITC recipients
already in the labor force and do not measure the EITC's effect on labor force participation. A
recent study estimates that the 1993 EITC changes will have a significant positive effect on labor
force participation by single parents. See Dickert, Houser & Scholz, supra note 61, at 3, 34-35.
63 According to John Karl Scholz, the 1993 changes increased by 42 % the number of EITC
recipients who are eligible for the earnings subsidy, primarily by extending the EITC to childless
workers. At the same time, however, the 1993 changes "almost double" payments to workers in
the phase-out range. See Scholz, supra note 62, at 78. Three Treasury economists estimate that
the 1993 changes in the EITC will cause earnings among EITC recipients with children to fall by
2.4%. See Janet Holtzblatt, Janet McCubbin & Robert Gillette, Promoting Work Through the
EITC, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 59 1, 599 (1994).
64 The interaction among those variables in the EITC is complicated by the addition of three
new variables: the earnings subsidy rate, the income level at which phase-in ends, and the income
level at which phase-out begins. See HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 53, at 64-66. For discus-
sions of these trade offs in traditional income-transfer programs, see IRWIN GARFINKEL & SARA
McLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 179-80 (1986); GREEN, supra note 6, at
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become available to a larger and relatively richer group.65 The only
way to reduce marginal tax rates without expanding the pool of eligi-
ble recipients is to reduce benefits.
The recent expansion of the EITC illustrates the intractability of
these trade offs. Legislation expanding the EITC in 1990 increased
the benefit reduction rate from ten to eighteen percent.66 The Clinton
administration proposed another substantial increase in EITC benefits
in February 1993 but expressed concern about the potential disincen-
tive effects of increasing the EITC marginal tax rate still further.67
The administration's original proposal would actually have lowered
marginal tax rates in the EITC but at the cost of increasing the in-
come cutoff dramatically - to $30,000 for families with two or more
children.68 Apparently in response to charges that the plan awarded
too great a fraction of benefits to relatively well-off recipients, the ad-
ministration changed its proposal to incorporate a somewhat higher
marginal tax rate than the original plan and a lower income cutoff.69
The final legislation provides a benefit reduction rate of twenty-one
percent and an income cutoff of $27,000. 70
68-81; JAMES C. OHLS & HAROLD BEEBOUT, THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM: DESIGN TRADEOFFS,
POLICY, AND IMPACTS 40-43 (1993).
65 The increased revenue cost of the larger program may also require raising taxes. The dis-
tortionary effects of those taxes add further to the cost of the program change and may even
outweigh its benefits.
66 See Pub. L. No. 101-508, § I I I I I, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-408 to -09 (1990), amended by Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 312 , 433-35
(1993) (codified at I.R.C. § 32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993». The 1990 legislation increased the EITC's
maximum benefit (by raising the earnings subsidy percentage) but continued to cut off benefits at
$20,264 of income. See H.R. REP. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1035-36 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2740-41 (noting that, under prior law, the EITC credit rate was 14% of
the first $6,810 of earnings and that the EITC phase-out rate was 10% for earnings over $10,73°).
Under these parameters, the EITC was completely phased out at earnings of $20,264 [«.14 x
$6810) - .10 ($20,264 - $10,730» =$953.40 - $953.40 =0]. The 1990 Act raised the credit rate to
25% of the first $6810 of earnings and increased the phase-out rate to 17.86%. [d. at 1036.
These new parameters also imply an EITC income cutoff of $20,264 [«.25 x $6810) - .1786
($20,264 - $10,73°» = 0]. As a consequence, the benefit reduction rate rose from 10% to nearly
18%.
67 See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Summaries of the Administration's Revenue Proposals,
Feb. 19, 1993 (draft), reproduced in 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 43-1,79,121, Feb. 23,1993, available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Taxtxt File.
68 See id. at 121-22 (describing an earnings subsidy of 40%, a phase-out rate of 13.76%, and
an income cutoff of $30,000).
69 See Timothy Noah & Laurie McGinley, Advocate for the Poor, Respected on All Sides,
Secures a Pivotal Role in Expanding Tax Credit, WALL ST. j., July 26, 1993, at AI2 (explaining
that objections by Robert Greenstein led the Clinton administration to revise its 1993 EITC pro-
posals); see also 1993 Welfare Reform Hearings, supra note 29, at 18-19 (testimony of Samuel Y.
Sessions, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Dep't of the Treasury) (describing the adminis-
tration's revised proposal as of March 30, 1993, which contained a 39.7% credit, a 19.83% phase-
out rate, and a $28,000 income cutoff).
70 See I.R.C. § 32(b) (Supp. V 1993). The 1993 legislation also reduced the income level at
which benefit reduction first occurs to $1 I ,000. See id.
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The second dilemma is that lowering benefit reduction rates may
not increase aggregate labor supply.71 Although lowering the EITC's
marginal tax rate reduces potential work disincentives for current pro-
gram participants in the phase-out range, it raises the income cutoff (if
benefit levels and other parameters are constant). As a consequence, a
new set of recipients becomes eligible for benefits - and subject to
the attendant work disincentives. Thus, a decrease in marginal tax
rates increases aggregate labor supply among program participants
only if the increase in work effort by current recipients outweighs the
decrease in work effort by new recipients. Studies of past changes in
AFDC benefit reduction rates suggest that the two effects may cancel
each other out,72 but no corresponding studies of the EITC have been
undertaken.
As the EITC has outgrown its traditional role as tax relief for the
poor to become an expensive, large-scale income-transfer program, op-
ponents have used the theoretical and empirical charge of work disin-
centives to attack the EITC. For example, one prominent critic of the
EITC, economist Marvin Kosters, argues that the 1993 expansion of
the credit was misguided. 73 Kosters contends that the effects on total
economic output of the EITC's potential work disincentives are likely
to be large, because many more EITC recipients fall in the EITC's
phase-out range than in the earnings subsidy range, and workers in
the phase-out range are more productive.74 Kosters argues, in effect,
that it makes little sense to provide a potential work incentive for a
relatively small number of welfare recipients at the cost of creating
potentially large reductions in the work effort of many more poor
workers who are already working. 75
The EITC's advocates respond with two arguments. First, some
commentators claim that the EITC is a desirable policy, because its
71 See Gary Burtless, The Effect of Reform on Employment, Earnings, and Income, in WEL-
FARE POLICY FOR THE 19905, supra note 18, at 103, 133; Robert Moffitt, A Problem with the
Negative Income Tax, 17 ECON. LETTERS 261, 261-65 (1985). Hoffman and Seidman note the
possible operation of this effect in the EITC. See HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 53, at 43-47.
72 See Burtless, supra note 71, at 130-34; Moffitt, supra note 52, at 41.
73 See Marvin H. Kosters, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Working Poor, AM. EN-
TERPRISE, May/June 1993, at 64, 68-70.
74 Kosters estimates that, before the 1993 legislation, the ratio of EITC recipients in the sta-
tionary and income test ranges of the EITe to those in the earnings subsidy range was about five
or six to one. He projects that, under the Clinton administration's Spring 1993 proposal to ex-
pand the EITC and raise the income cutoff to $28,000, the ratio would have risen to about eight
or nine to one. See id. at 68-69; see also 1993 Welfare Reform Hearings, supra note 29, at 111-14
(testimony of Marvin Kosters) (arguing that the Clinton proposal increases the percentage and the
absolute number of EITC recipients who face potential work disincentives). The 1993 amend-
ments ultimately raised the income cutoff to $27,000. See supra note 38.
7S See Kosters, supra note 73, at 72. Kosters mentions that distributional considerations as
well as work disincentives should be considered in evaluating the EITC but does so in one line of
an article devoted entirely to the EITC's potential work disincentives. See id.
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aggregate work disincentives are likely to be smaller than those of
traditional welfare programs. 76 Although this claim seems plausible,
more empirical work is necessary to substantiate any conclusions
about the current EITC's aggregate effects. 77 Second, other propo-
nents say, the EITC's aggregate effects on labor supply, whatever they
may be, do not tell the whole story: the effects of the EITC on work
by different groups of EITC recipients are also important for social
policy. Estimates of the EITC's labor-supply effects suggest that it
increases work effort by a small amount, on net, for the very poor
workers in the earnings subsidy range. 78 EITC advocates argue that
this effect is crucial, because the credit provides the greatest potential
work incentives to the poorest recipients and to nonworkers, who be-
gin with the weakest attachment to the labor force. At the same time,
the EITC's income test concentrates potential disincentives on slightly
higher-income workers who already are in the work force instead of
on all program participants.79 These features may improve labor-force
participation over time by easing the transition from welfare to
work.8o Thus, EITC proponents characterize it as an "anti-underclass"
program - a way of moving the poorest and most disadvantaged po-
tential workers into the labor force. 8 ! These arguments concede that
potential and actual work disincentives are properly viewed as unde-
sirable features of the EITC but argue that incentives for some groups
are more important than disincentives for others.82
The central problem with the conventional debate is that it focuses
too narrowly on work disincentives. First, the "work disincentive" la-
bel carries a pejorative weight in the writings of both advocates and
opponents of the EITC that is unjustified in conventional economic
analysis. Even if the EITC leads some recipients to work fewer hours,
these workers would be making a rational choice to use the extra dol-
lars added to their wages by the EITC to buy a few hours of leisure
76 See 1993 Welfare Reform Hearings, supra note 29, at 92 (testimony of Gary Burtless);
George K. Yin, Summary of EITC Conference Proceedings, II AM. J. TAX POL'y 299, 310-11
(1994)·
77 See supra pp. 549-5 I (describing the limitations of existing estimates of the EITC's labor-
supply effects).
78 See supra note 61.
79 See HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 53, at 47; SHAPIRO & GREENSTEIN, supra note 8, at
30.
80 A recent study concluded that the EITC may increase labor-force participation, particularly
by single parents. See Dickert, Houser & Scholz, supra note 61, at 3, 34-35.
81 See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, Credit Where Due, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 1993, at 6.
82 See, e.g., 1993 Welfare Reform Hearings, supra note 29, at 92 (testimony of Gary Burtless)
(noting that the EITC's work disincentives are smaller than those of other transfers). In addition,
most descriptive analyses of the EITC focus on potential and actual work disincentives and thus
reflect prevalent concerns. See, e.g., Holtzblatt, McCubbin & Gillette, supra note 63, at 596-99;
Scholz, supra note 62, at 76-79.
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or time for nonmarket work (for example, child care).83 Although the
EITC recipients' pre-transfer wages would decline due to the reduc-
tion in work effort, their total economic incomes would rise. The new
package of cash earnings, cash transfer, and leisure would make them,
on net, better off. Further, if EITC recipients use their additional time
for nonmarket work, such as care for children, the elderly, and the
sick, their choice benefits these other people and, potentially, society as
a whole.84 Thus, the potential labor-supply reductions that some pol-
icy analysts find so troubling actually would increase the well-being of
the poor.85 In economists' terms, these free and rational choices be-
tween work and leisure maximize utility, which is the central norm
that animates traditional economic analysis.
Merely recognizing the potential economic value of reductions in
market work does not, of course, provide any definite means of weigh-
ing the economic costs and benefits of the EITC. Nevertheless, insist-
ing on that recognition adds an important dimension to the policy
debate. Although careful economists recognize this point, it is too
often disregarded in policy analyses as a technical detail rather than a
crucial aspect of the economics of income transfers.86
The relationship between utility and leisure affects analyses of
traditional welfare programs as well, of course. A welfare recipient
who chooses to "buy" leisure is also making a utility-maximizing
choice. For institutional reasons, however, the stakes differ in the
EITC and welfare, because welfare programs may allow recipients not
83 Marvin Kosters notes the "theoretical" relevance of leisure to the analysis of work disincen-
tives, but only in arguing against the EITC. Kosters argues that, if the EITC induces
nonworkers to work, "there is at least the theoretical cost to them of the loss of leisure." Yin,
supra note 76, at 311. But this point is incomplete: although nonworkers have less leisure than
they had before the EITC, their decision to work in exchange for an EITC benefit implies that
they value the package of EITC plus work more than the package of no EITC plus more leisure.
In other words, the EITC makes recipients better off, on net, whether they work more or less.
84 Feminists have emphasized the social value of nonmarket work, including caregiving, that
is typically though not exclusively performed by women. See, e.g., NANCY FOLBRE, WHO PAYS
FOR THE KIDS? 95-98 (1994) (describing the social importance of family labor and the exclusion of
family labor from conventional measures of economic activity).
85 Cf STANLEY MASTERS & IRWIN GARFINKEL, ESTIMATING THE LABOR SUPPLY EFFECTS
OF INCOME MAINTENANCE ALTERNATIVES 2 (1977) (arguing that reductions in gross national
product due to reductions in the labor supply of income maintenance recipients "is largely offset
by the value of the corresponding increases in leisure"); Edgar K. Browning & William R. John-
son, The Trade-Off Between Equality and Efficiency, 92 J. POL. ECON. 175, 197-201 (1984) (ob-
serving that adjusting estimates of the net efficiency cost of redistribution to take into account the
value of leisure increases the measured benefits of redistribution to transfer recipients and lowers
the measured detriment to high-income taxpayers who reduce work effort in response to taxes).
86 Economists may prefer to quantify the costs of labor-supply reductions rather than to spec-
ify and to defend normative views about the social benefits of redistribution. The danger, how-
ever, is that the legitimately narrow focus of economic scholarship can distort the terms of the
broader policy debate.
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to work at al1.87 Reframed, the question of work and welfare becomes
this: should welfare recipients be required to work even if it reduces
their current utility?88 Many argue that they should, to improve their
long-term prospects, to avoid "dependency" on the state, or to meet a
fundamental duty of citizenship, for example.89
The EITC is a different story. EITC recipients, unlike welfare re-
cipients, cannot stop working altogether if they want to continue re-
ceiving EITC benefits. They can only choose to work fewer hours.
Although some might argue that reductions in work effort of any de-
gree are unacceptable, that argument is likely to be unpersuasive to
many: working less is quite different from not working at all. The
choice to work, for example, thirty hours a week rather than forty
should be much less troubling than the choice not to work, especially
in light of the presumptive enhancement of the working poor's well-
being that results from their free choice to consume more leisure given
their enhanced incomes.9o Further, the working poor with children
under age eighteen - the group that receives the largest EITC bene-
fits - may reap particularly large gains in well-being from having
more time for child care.91
This analysis does not deny that labor-supply reductions among the
poor (and among the richer taxpayers whose higher taxes finance the
program) may raise the economic cost of redistribution. However, de-
bates that focus solely on the magnitudes of the EITC's potential
work disincentives for EITC recipients are seriously incomplete, even
within the framework of a traditional economic analysis. A thorough
comparison of the economic effects of different transfer programs
would assess both the costs and benefits of redistribution.92 Evalua-
87 For data on work by AFDC recipients, see sources cited above in note 52.
88 One might argue that restricting choices in the short run will improve well-being in the
long run by building human capital that creates opportunities for higher earnings and greater
social mobility. On the other hand, although a degree of economic paternalism may be warranted
in moving welfare recipients into the working world, EITC recipients, who are already at work,
may be comparatively well prepared to evaluate their own prospects for future advancement.
89 See supra Part II.
90 But cf Jon Elster, Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 49, at 53, 63 (arguing, in another context, that a small reduc-
tion in hours worked might inflict "cumulative long-term damage" to social relations and to a
sense of worth, which would outweigh the short-term gain in leisure). One interesting effect of
the EITC's structure is that a decision by an EITC recipient in the phase-in range to work less
actually saves the government money; that is, if the income effect is strong enough, she may
choose additional leisure at the cost of foregoing extra EITC benefits. Ultimately, the central
problem is normative: why should we be troubled if the EITC allows people to work 15 hours a
week rather than 40? Should we require people to work full-time even if their own preferences
would lead them to work less?
91 See SHAPIRO & GREENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 30.
92 For example, a careful analysis might consider not only the receipt of money by EITC
recipients, but also the long-term value of work to EITC recipients and to society, as well as the
more general benefits of redistribution, including the value of altruistic behavior and of enhanced
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tions of the EITC and other social welfare policies that turn only on
the magnitude of work disincentives implicitly judge programs based
on costs alone and, as a consequence, incorporate an anti-redistributive
bias: if effects on work effort are (implicitly) the principal criterion,
less redistributive policies will tend to prevail. Following the logic of
these arguments, no redistribution at all would be the best choice, be-
cause it would cost the least.
Another explanation for the peculiarity of debates over the EITC
and work is that such debates actually reflect unacknowledged norma-
tive tensions. Is the goal of the EITC to increase the well-being of the
poor, to get the poor to work (even if they are worse off), or to in-
crease gross domestic product (GDP)?93 It may be that critics of the
EITC's potential work disincentives really reject the first goal in favor
of the second or third, despite their nominal obeisance to the conven-
tions of economic analysis. Although proponents of the latter two
goals are likely to find the EITC preferable to traditional welfare pro-
grams, these goals actually support other policies: no redistribution at
all, or redistribution combined with mandatory work would seem to
serve these goals even better.94 Of course, if maximizing gross domes-
tic product were truly the objective, mandatory work requirements
should apply to the rich and middle class as well as to the poor. The
participation by the poor in community life. See generally ROSEN, supra note 56, at 166-67
(enumerating a variety of possible benefits of redistribution). Another possible social benefit of
the EITC is that aid to the working poor may alleviate the economic impact of the transition to
free trade and integrated world markets, which may put downward pressure on already low
wages. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate Governance and the Transition Costs of Capi-
talism 1-4 (Oct. 6, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library)
(observing that the law and legal rules can mitigate losses that arise from transitions in capitalist
economies). Some studies have attempted to quantify the extent to which economic losses due to
labor-supply reductions exceed gains attributable to redistribution, but these studies have taken a
rather limited view of the welfare gains attributable to redistribution and count only the dispos-
able income (and leisure) gained by the recipients of transfers. See, e.g., ROBERT K. TRIEST, THE
EFFICIENCY COST OF INCREASED PROGRESSIVITY (National Bureau of Economic Research Work-
ing Paper No. 4535, 1993) (estimating that the net cost of an increase in the EITC is as low as
20¢ per dollar of transfer); Charles L. Ballard, The Marginal Efficiency Cost of Redistribution, 78
AM. ECON. REV. 1019, 1019 (1988) (estimating marginal efficiency costs of 50¢ to $1.30 per dollar
transferred); Browning & Johnson, supra note 85, at 199 (finding that people in the top three
income quintiles lose $3.49 in disposable income, adjusted for the value of leisure, in order to
increase the disposable income by one dollar, adjusted for the value of leisure, of those in the
bottom two quintiles).
93 The taxonomy, of course, is a rough one. For example, the first two goals are not always
easily distinguishable. It may be that the poor will be better off in the long run if they work, and
thereby build human capital, despite the short-term loss in utility. In that case, the first two goals
may coalesce, if the first goal values long-term well-being more highly than it does short-term
well-being. Resolving this issue requires the articulation of a normative ground for preferring
long-term over short-term well-being when the two conflict. Another example of ambiguity in
this taxonomy is the unspecified nature of "well-being" in the first goal. Amartya Sen, for one,
has noted the multiplicity of conceptions of well-being. See SEN, supra note 5J, at 31-55.
94 See MEAD, NEW POLITICS, supra note 13, at 160-62, 171.
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basic point is that, for analytic clarity, critics of work disincentives in
the EITe should make their goals explicit and thus open to debate.95
A more careful economic evaluation of the EITC should also take
into account the magnitude and pattern of redistribution under the
EITC and alternative programs. The EITC provides no benefits to
nonworkers, little to those who work part-time at very low wages, and
quite a bit to those who earn a total amount comparable to full-time
work at the minimum wage. Thaditional welfare programs, in con-
trast, typically provide the greatest benefits to nonworkers. Although
the distributional effects of the EITC relative to welfare may be of
relatively little concern as long as the EITC merely supplements wel-
fare, they will become extremely important if the EITC remains in
place while traditional welfare benefits are curtailed. That prospect
frames the distributional comparison in the sharpest terms: are we
willing to deny income transfers to the poorest nonworkers and their
children? To be complete and persuasive, comparisons of labor-supply
reductions must be accompanied by careful positive and normative
evaluations of distributional patterns.
Finally, any comparison of the economic effects of the EITC and
alternative policies should also consider the distributional and incen-
tive effects of the taxes levied to finance the programs. For example,
potential reductions in labor supply by taxpayers in response to higher
taxes may reduce both total economic output and taxpayers' well-
being.96 These changes represent additional costs of redistribution.
Or, for example, the distributive impact of the taxes required to fi-
nance the program may either enhance or hinder the redistributive im-
pact of the transfer program.97 Taking into account the whole picture
- taxes as well as transfers, distribution as well as incentives - can
95 Commentators have noted similar tensions among the goals of "workfare" programs, which
may be variously intended to improve the circumstances of the poor, to require work in exchange
for welfare benefits even if the work experience does nothing to enhance employment prospects or
to save the government money. See, e.g., HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note II, at 185-86.
96 Even programs that appear to be financed by budget cuts rather than by new taxes are still
financed by "higher taxes" - that is, taxes remain higher (and create potentially greater disincen-
tive effects) than if these programs too were eliminated.
97 Non-income-tested, or "universal" programs illustrate the pitfalls of partial comparisons.
Universal programs, such as family allowance programs, pay benefits to all eligible claimants
without regard to income. These programs may appear at first to create no work disincentives,
because they do not reduce benefits as income rises, and thus may appear to distribute benefits
equally to high- and low-income classes. Taking into account the financing side of the picture,
however, universal benefits provide to any recipient only a net benefit equal to the gross benefit
less her allocable portion of the taxes that finance the program. As a consequence, even a nomi-
nally universal program in effect contains an implicit income test, which determines the overall
distributional effect of the program and its pattern of work disincentives. See GREEN, supra note
6, at 62-65, 186-87; STANLEY S. SURREY, Statement Before the President's Commission on In-
come Maintenance Programs, in TAX POLICY AND TAX REFORM: 1961-1969 at 285, 308 (1973);
Irwin Garfinkel, Introduction to INCOME-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS: THE CASE FOR AND
AGAINST I, 3-4 (Irwin Garfinkel ed., 1982). This analysis still overlooks some important issues
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dramatically change a comparison of alternative programs. The im-
portance of a comprehensive analysis, although axiomatic in public fi-
nance theory, is too often forgotten in policy evaluations of the
EITC.98
B. The EITC "Mamage Penalty": Facing the Realities of
Program Design
Debates over the EITC also reflect concerns about potential mari-
tal disincentives in income-transfer programs. Single-parent families,
particularly those headed by women, tend to be disproportionately
poor and constitute a growing segment of the population.99 The
causes of poverty among female-headed families are complex, as are
the causes of the declining marriage rate. lOO However, if redistributive
programs bolster an existing social trend that contributes to pre-trans-
fer poverty, once again behavioral effects may raise the cost of redistri-
bution. Despite popular stereotypes, empirical studies suggest that
welfare has contributed little to the growth in the number of single-
parent families. 101 Nevertheless, the perceived effects of marital disin-
centives in welfare programs continue to playa significant role in both
popular and academic discussions of welfare policy.t02
EITC advocates point out that, unlike welfare, the EITC is fully
available to two-parent families. l03 Critics of the EITC argue that the
(for example, how to identify the "marginal" taxes associated with a given transfer program), but
it illustrates an important conceptual point.
98 A recent study by Robert Triest illustrates the importance of this point. Triest initially
concludes that the net efficiency cost of an increase in the EITC is Quite low compared to the cost
of alternative programs, but he then finds that, if the alternative programs are compared to a
modified EITC that achieves a similar distributional pattern, the efficiency differences disappear.
See TRIEST, supra note 92, at 22.
99 See 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at I I I I, I 16 I.
100 Garfinkel and McLanahan attribute poverty among female-headed families to three factors:
low earnings (relative to those of men), a lack of support from noncustodial parents, and meager
government benefits. See GARFINKEL & McLANAHAN, supra note 64, at 17. For a discussion of
reasons for a declining marriage rate, see Robert D. Mare & Christopher Winship, Socioeconomic
Change and the Decline of Marriage for Blacks and Whites, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 175,
175-202 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
101 The number of single-parent families has grown while welfare benefits have declined in
real terms, and single parenthood has increased among all income classes. See MARY ]. BANE &
DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 111-12 (1994); David
T. Ellwood & Lawrence H. Summers, Poverty in America: Is Welfare the Answer or the Prob-
lem?, in SHELDON H. DANZIGER & DANIEL H. WEINBERG, FIGHTING POVERTY, at 78, 92-97
(1986); Moffitt, supra note 52, at 30-3I.
102 Handler and Hasenfeld describe the longstanding American tradition of hostility and suspi-
cion toward single mothers. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note II, at 60-74, 103-05. For
a critique of cultural stereotypes that blame single mothers for poverty, see Martha A. Fineman,
Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.]. 274, 274-89.
103 See, e.g., 139 CONGo REC. H5532 (daily ed. July 30, 1993) (statement of Rep. Bill Richard-
son). In contrast, AFDC typically enables single parents to obtain aid more easily than can two-
parent families. Although all states must now provide some benefits to two-parent families with
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program, is nevertheless biased against marriage, because it creates
"marriage penalties" that may discourage poor workers from marrying
(or may encourage them to divorce).lo4 Although understanding poten-
tial disincentives is useful, it is crucial to remember that they do not
translate automatically into behavior. A firm conclusion must await
empirical evidence, but at the outset it seems at least as plausible to
expect that the EITC (like welfare) has little effect on family structure
as to predict a dramatic impact. los For example, the EITC's potential
disincentives may be blunted by the numerous psychological, social,
and economic factors that influence marital decisions and by EITC
recipients' apparently limited understanding of the terms of the
program. 106
Further, critiques of the EITC's marital disincentives fail to con-
front the policy trade offs inherent in designing the EITC or any other
redistributive program. Marriage penalties are a virtually unavoidable
characteristic of income transfers that tailor benefits to need.
Although it is in theory possible to redesign income-tested transfer pro-
grams to avoid penalizing marriage, the necessary changes would com-
promise policy goals that many may find more important than
marriage neutrality.lo7
Marriage penalties arise from the need to tailor EITC (or welfare)
benefits to need. Theorists generally agree that the aggregate income
of the family provides a better measure of economic status than indi-
vidual income. For example, consider two individuals, each with no
income or assets. Measuring the income of each individual alone
an unemployed principal earner, benefits may be available only for part of the year, and eligibility
conditions can exclude many two-parent families, for example, if the principal earner works 100
hours a month or more or has no established work history. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); 45 C.F.R. § 233. 101 (1993)·
104 See, e.g., COLIN D. CAMPBELL & WILLIAM L. PEIRCE, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
11-12 (1980); Francine J. Lipman & James E. Williamson, Recent Proposals to Redesign the
EITC: A Reply to an Economist's Response, 62 TAX NOTES 1175, 1179 (1994); Edward J. McCaf-
fery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look At Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA
L. REV. 983, 995 (1993).
105 McCaffery and Scholz are sensitive to the empirical issue. McCaffery argues that the EITC
marriage penalty occurs "at exactly the point where legally sanctioned marriages might be most
sensitive to economic conditions." McCaffery, supra note 104, at 1016. Scholz notes the absence
of empirical evidence and suggests that the EITC will provide an opportunity for examining the
effects of income transfers on marital status. See John K. Scholz, Tax Policy and the Working
Poor: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 15 Focus I, 10 (1993-1994).
106 See, e.g., OLSON WITH DAVIS, supra note 55, at 12-13.
107 This "marriage penalty" arises when a couple is better off, in the aggregate, by remaining
unmarried (or divorcing) rather than marrying (or remaining married). Critics of redistributive
programs sometimes point to a second type of potential disincentive for marriage. By providing a
source of support for women outside of marriage, income-transfer programs may make divorce
easier and therefore more likely. These critics' focus on marital breakups overlooks the positive
effects of enabling women to leave mentally or physically abusive or otherwise unproductive
marriages.
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would suggest that the two individuals have an equal need for transfer
benefits. The comparison is misleading, however, if one is a minor
child in a family with a comfortable annual income and the other is
the unemployed principal earner in a family with no other source of
income. For this reason, both income-transfer programs and the fed-
eral income tax typically seek to award benefits or to assess taxes
based on family incomes. lOB
Although measuring family income tends to promote (relatively) ac-
curate income measurement, it typically does so at the expense of mar-
riage neutrality in the EITC and in other income-transfer programs
tailored to need. The problem arises because these programs typically
create "regressive" patterns of marginal tax rates - that is, benefit
reduction rates that typically exceed the marginal income tax rates ap-
plicable to those taxpayers with incomes just above the program's in-
come cutoff. l09 The dilemma for the EITC and other income-transfer
programs is that they cannot simultaneously maintain regressive mar-
ginal tax rates, equal treatment of families with equal incomes, and
marriage neutrality. Any system can have two, but not all three of
these characteristics. I 10 Only a system of constant (flat) marginal tax
rates could achieve both equal treatment of families and marriage neu-
108 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1392-93 (1975); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Tax Bur-
dens, 59 TEX. L. REV. I, 25 (1980); William A. Klein, Familial Relationships and Economic Well-
Being: Family Unit Rules for a Negative Income Tax, 8 HARV. ]. ON LEGIS. 361, 370 (1971). For
a discussion of the family unit rules in AFDC, Food Stamps, and SSI, see 1994 GREEN BOOK,
cited above in note 2, at 327, 762-63, 217-18; and OHLS & BEEBOUT, cited above in note 64, at
21-25. For a discussion of the family unit rules of the federal income tax, see Part IV.B below.
109 See Graph 3, supra p. 550; Table 3, supra p. 550. For example, an EITC recipient may
face an EITC phase-out rate of 2 I %, a payroll tax rate of nearly eight percent, and, simultane-
ously, a 15 % marginal federal income tax rate for a cumulative marginal rate of 44%, but a
worker with income just above the EITC income cutoff faces only the eight percent payroll tax
and the 15 % marginal income tax rate for a cumulative marginal rate of 23 %. The regressive
pattern of marginal tax rates is characteristic of income-tested transfer programs. See Garfinkel,
supra note 97, at 4.
110 Consider a simple income-transfer program with a maximum benefit of $5000, a benefit
reduction rate of 25%, and (therefore) an income cutoff of $20,000. Assume that the income tax
system imposes tax at a rate of 0% on income less than or equal to $20,000 and at a marginal tax
rate of 15 % on income that exceeds $20,000. Consider four individuals:
Name Income Tax (single)
A $ 0 - $ 5,000
B $ 30,000 + $ 1,500
C $ 15,000 - $ 1,250
D $ 15,000 - $ 1,250
If A and B marry and C and D marry, an income-support program that preserves marriage
neutrality would leave unchanged the aggregate taxes (positive or negative) paid by each couple.
That system, however, would treat the two equal-income couples very differently. The AlB
couple would receive a net benefit of $3500, but the BIC couple would receive a net benefit of
only $2500. Adjusting the rate schedule so that both couples receive the same net benefit would
necessarily impose a marriage bonus or penalty on one or both couples. For an analogous demon-
stration in the context of the income tax, see Bittker, cited above in note 108, at 1395-96.
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trality.lll In essence, aggregation of family income in an income-tested
transfer program makes marriage neutrality impossible.112 Critics of
the EITC's marriage penalty typically overlook the roots of such pen-
alties in the very structure of income-transfer programs. 113
The design of the EITC exacerbates this inherent marriage pen-
alty. The EITC is available to both single-parent and married-couple
families, but the amount of the credit is the same for single parents
and for married couples that have the same income and number of
children. Thus, a married couple earning $28,000 receives no EITC,
but two single people, each earning $14,000, may each receive a sub-
stantial EITC.114 As a consequence, the EITC can impose huge mar-
riage penalties, particularly relative to income. 115 In certain other
cases, however, it can actually award marriage bonuses. 116 This aspect
of the EITC's marriage penalty could be eliminated by modifying the
EITC, but at the cost of either cutting benefits for single parents or
111 See Jonathan R. Kesselman, Taxpayer Behavior and the Design of a Credit Income Tax, in
INCOME-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS, supra note 97, at 216-17, 222-23.
112 A similar dilemma occurs within the federal income tax system. An income tax system
cannot simultaneously maintain progressive marginal tax rates, equal taxation of families with
equal incomes, and marriage neutrality. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 108, at 1395-<}6; ROSEN,
supra note 56, at 402-04. Federal income tax policy has wrestled with this dilemma and has
adopted different compromises over the years. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 108, at 1399-1416,
1428-31; Gann, supra note 108, at 10-24.
113 A marriage penalty may arise even in an income-transfer program that provides benefits to
married couples equal to twice the benefits available to a single person with the same income.
Consider what happens if, in the example in note 110 above, the income-transfer system provides
married couples with a basic benefit of $10,000, phased out at 25 %, with an income cutoff of
$4°,000. In that case, the AlB and CID couples each receive a benefit of $2500, which is marriage
neutral as to CID but penalizes AlB.
The examples in this Article highlight the structural roots of marriage penalties in income
taxes and transfers. Actual marriage penalties or bonuses for EITC recipients are determined by
the complex interplay of several factors, including the regressive marginal tax rate structure cre-
ated by the juncture of the EITC's phase-out rate and the first income tax bracket, the potential
marriage penalty created by awarding the same EITC benefits to married couples and single
individuals with the same income, and the marriage bonuses and penalties of the federal income
tax system.
114 In 1996, a married couple with two children and earnings (and total income) of $28,000 (in
1994 dollars) will receive no EITC. If, however, the couple divorced, each obtained custody of
one child, and each had post-divorce earnings of $14,000, each person would receive an EITC of
about $1561, for an aggregate gain of $3122. This example ignores the federal income tax and, of
course, the non-tax costs of divorce. Although this example illustrates how large EITC marriage
penalties can be, the assumption that each parent obtains custody of one child may be unrealistic.
115 As a percentage of earnings, the EITC marriage penalties are among the largest imposed in
the federal income tax system. See CBO, supra note 10, at 37-40.
116 The EITC's marriage bonus arises if, for example, a childless worker marries a nonworker
with children: in that case, the couple may receive a higher EITC than if the individuals remain
unmarried. This analysis may overstate the net marriage bonus to the extent that the custodial
parent loses AFDC or other benefits.
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raIsIng benefits for married couples. 117 Even such a modified EITC,
however, would still face the marriage penalties or bonuses inherent in
an income-tested transfer program with regressive marginal tax
rates. IIB
In theory, the EITC or any income-tested transfer program could
be restructured so that it awarded only marriage bonuses and never
marriage penalties. The resulting pattern of benefits, however, would
probably strike many as undesirable. For example, one of the
strangest consequences would be the payment of EITC benefits to rel-
atively high-income married couples. To understand why, imagine a
middle-class couple with two children and total earnings of $5°,000.
In a hypothetical worst-case scenario (worst case for the Treasury, that
is), if this couple divorced, one would gain custody of both children
and would have earnings that qualify for the maximum EITC. To
avoid creating any incentive to divorce, we would have to award the
maximum EITC to the intact couple, reduced to reflect the loss of the
federal income tax marriage bonus for couples with disparate earn-
ings. 119 Many policymakers would probably accept some EITC mar-
riage penalty in order to keep the program targeted more closely to the
poor.
A similar but analytically distinct alternative is to award the EITC
to each worker based on her earnings alone, regardless of marital sta-
tus. Under this system, by definition, a change in marital status would
117 For example, suppose that a married couple with two children remained entitled to a maxi-
mum EITC of $3370 based on the current terms of the program. At the same time, however,
suppose that the benefit schedule for a single parent were changed so that it contained the same
earnings subsidy and phase-out rates (40% and 21.06 %, respectively), but all dollar thresholds
were half as much (maximum EITC of $1685, reached at earnings of $4,212.5°, with phase-out
beginning at earnings of $5500, and an income cutoff of $13,500). In that case, the EITC would
create neither a marriage bonus nor a marriage penalty for a couple earning $14,000 each.
118 Continuing the example from note 113 above, consider a couple with two children, one
person earning $6000 and one earning $24,000. If married, they would not be entitled to any
EITC and would pay federal income tax of about $2078. If the couple divorced and the lower
earner obtained custody of both children, he would receive an EITC (under the modified program
described in the preceding note) of about $1580 and pay no federal income tax, while the higher
earner would pay about $2663 in federal income tax. The net tax gain from divorce to the couple
would be $995 (old tax liability of $2078 less new tax liability, net of EITC, of $1038). (The
example uses 1994 tax rates.)
119 For example, assume that John and Mary, a married couple with two children, jointly earn
$50,000. John earns $10,000, and Mary earns $4°,000. Filing jointly in 1994, John and Mary will
owe federal income taxes of $5078. If, instead, John and Mary divorce, and John receives custody
of the two children, he will be entitled to an EITC of $3370 and will owe no federal income
taxes, and Mary will owe federal income taxes of $6823. Thus, the couple's total tax bill falls to
$3453 ($6823 - $3370) if they divorce, which creates a marriage penalty (or higher tax bill) of
$1625 ($5078 - $3453). To remove the marriage penalty, John and Mary should be entitled, as a
married couple, to an EITC of $1625. (Note that this solution removes the marriage penalty that
the EITC creates in order to avoid creating a potential incentive for divorce. In the absence of
the EITC, upon divorce, John would owe no tax, and Mary would owe tax of $6823; that is, in
the absence of the EITC, there would be a marriage bonus to John and Mary of $1745.)
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not decrease (or increase) EITC benefits. This proposal, however, sim-
ply illustrates once again the trade off described above: awarding the
EITC based on individual income avoids creating a marriage penalty
but does so by eliminating the tailoring of benefits to need based on
family income. As a consequence, even high-income families could
qualify for the EITC. For example, a family in which the husband
earns $10,000 and the wife earns $200,000 could qualify for the maxi-
mum EITC benefit. 120 Similarly, although awarding the EITC based
on separate incomes avoids creating a marriage bonus, it would create
disparities in treatment by awarding the EITC to some, but not all
families with the same level of high earnings. I21 Thus, the EITC, like
other income-tested transfer programs, creates unavoidable and diffi-
cult policy trade offs between potential marital disincentives and accu-
rate targeting of benefits.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE EITC AND OTHER TAX-
BASED TRANSFER PROGRAMS
The conceptual link between income-transfer programs and the in-
come tax has fascinated economists and policy analysts for years. Ad-
vocates of the negative income tax and, more recently, of the EITC
have proposed administrative integration of the tax and transfer sys-
tems as a route to welfare reform. 122 These analysts point to two prin-
cipal advantages of tax-transfer integration. First, proponents argue,
the EITC and other tax-based transfers can enhance administrative
120 The exact dollar benefit would depend on the number of children in the family and how
they were grouped with the two parents for EITe purposes.
121 In addition, identifying separate incomes for EITC purposes alone could be difficult, be-
cause the federal income tax is structured to measure joint incomes. Couples would face obvious
incentives to shift income and to reallocate itemized deductions in order to maximize the EITC.
For a discussion of administrative issues under an income tax with individual filing, see Alicia H.
Munnell, The Couple Versus the Individual Under the Federal Personal Income Tax, in THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 247, 273-77 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980).
122 It is important to distinguish between tax-transfer integration (administering transfer pro-
grams through the tax system) and consolidation (replacing various tax and transfer programs
with a single program). The negative income tax plans of the 1960s and 1970S typically featured
both integration and consolidation, usually by replacing a variety of traditional transfer programs
with a single tax-based transfer program. In some cases, however, negative income tax plans
contemplated administration through a welfare agency rather than through the tax system. See
SURREY, supra note 97, at 3 I 2-13 (comparing administration of a negative income tax by the
Internal Revenue Service and by other agencies). For more recent examples of tax-transfer inte-
gration and consolidation, see ROBERT HAVEMAN, STARTING EVEN 156-58 (1988), which proposes
tax credits to replace AFDC, SSI, food stamps, and housing assistance; and Jonathan B. Forman,
Administrative Savings From Synchronizing Social Welfare Programs and Tax Provisions, 13 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5, 64-72 (1993), which advocates a system of refundable tax
credits to replace many current programs. The EITC, on the other hand, attempts only tax-
transfer integration, and that is my focus here.
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efficiency by reducing bureaucratic cost and complexity.123 Welfare
administration is labor-intensive, expensive, and heavily dependent on
"street-level" bureaucrats, who may administer programs in a manner
at odds with their formal terms. 124 In contrast, tax-based transfers
like the EITC make use of the existing institutions of the federal in-
come tax and thus are cheaper to administer. 125
Second, advocates claim, tax-based transfers can reduce the stigma
and social isolation associated with welfare. David Ellwood, for exam-
ple, argues that, under the EITC, "[p]eople are helped without any
need of a stigmatizing, invasive, and often degrading welfare system,
and their autonomy is increased, not decreased. Since [the EITC]
truly would be part of the tax system . . . , people would not be iso-
lated."126 Tax-transfer integration may also enhance the EITC's polit-
ical appeal: Theda Skocpol argues that, because the EITC is
administered through the tax system, "in which all workers partici-
pate," the EITC is more like a politically acceptable universal program
than a politically unsustainable targeted program. 127
The idea of tax-transfer integration thus combines administrative,
humanitarian, and political goals. Despite its surface appeal, however,
the case for tax-transfer integration is less compelling than its propo-
123 See, e.g., AMERICAN ENTER. INST., THE ADMINISTRATION'S 1979 WELFARE REFORM PRO-
POSAL 27 (1979); ELLWOOD, supra note 8, at 114; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEV., NEGATIVE INCOME TAX 12 (1974).
On the other hand, a recent study suggests that a significant portion of EITC recipients pay
commercial tax preparers substantial sums to prepare their returns and rely on preparers to deter-
mine eligibility and amount of benefits. See OLSON WITH DAVIS, supra note 55, at 13 n.16 (citing
a survey of New Jersey families indicating that two-thirds of those who applied for the EITC
paid someone to do their taxes and describing the fees paid). Additional evidence confirming that
EITC recipients generally use commercial tax preparers would call into question the extent to
which tax-based administration is as nondiscretionary and automatic as it appears, and further
inquiry into the performance of these private-sector "case workers" would be appropriate.
124 See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 13-25 (1980) (arguing that
street-level bureaucrats effectively make agency policy).
125 In 1992, the costs of administering the federal income tax were around one percent of
revenue raised, compared to administrative costs of 13 % of benefits in the case of AFDC and
10% of benefits in the case of SSI. The cost of programs that are not income-tested can also be
quite low: the administrative cost of Social Security was typically one to two percent of benefits
paid. See Forman, supra note 122, at 34-35 (citing HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D
CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1992 GREEN BOOK, 82, 654, 823
(Comm. Print 1992».
126 ELLWOOD, supra note 8, at 115; see also HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note II, at 160
("To receive the tax credit one must file a federal tax return, a symbol of an earned economic
citizenship."); Phoebe H. Cottingham, Introduction to WELFARE POLICY FOR THE 1990s, supra
note 18, at I, 9 (noting that non-welfare strategies, including refundable tax credits, "will have less
of a labeling effect than do welfare policies"); cf. JOHN E. SCHWARZ & THOMAS J. VOLGY, THE
FORGOTTEN AMERICANS 142 (1992) ("The new program [of tax credits], implemented through the
privacy of the normal tax system, would remove th[e] stigma [associated with traditional
transfers].").
127 Theda Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Pov-
erty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS, supra note 100, at 411, 431.
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nents claim. The EITC illustrates the institutional dilemmas that in-
evitably arise in tax-based transfer programs that tailor benefits to
need. 128 Further, these inherent limitations of tax-based transfer pro-
grams suggest that there may be sound reasons to tolerate the concep-
tual and administrative untidiness of separate tax and transfer
systems. 129 More empirical and comparative work is needed to assess
the relative merits of the EITC. Advocates of the EITC and similar
tax-based transfers, however, should realize that these programs will
not be widely acceptable unless we moderate our expectations about
the goals such transfers can achieve.
Throughout this analysis, my focus is on identifying the inherent
structural limitations of the EITC and other tax-based programs. 130 I
do not attempt a comprehensive treatment of all issues of implementa-
tion - for example, questions of forms, procedures, or exactly how
alternative rules defining "income" or "family" might work. These
questions have been addressed by others 131 and are not my concern
here. Indeed, one theme in this Part is that analyses concerned only
with particular issues of EITC administration sometimes overlook the
structural features that create those problems and make those
problems resistant to reform.
A. Understanding the Inherent Limitations of Tax-Based
Programs: The Importance of Income Measurement in the EITC
The task of income measurement is fundamental to both income
tax and income-transfer systems. Both systems seek to assess eco-
nomic well-being, using income as a proxy, in order to apportion tax
128 The analysis in this Part applies to the EITe and to other income-tested, tax-based trans-
fers but does not necessarily apply to non-income-tested, tax-based transfers, which award bene-
fits without regard to income. A subsequent Article will address the applicability of this analysis
to non-income-tested programs. See infra Part V.
129 This Article focuses on the costs of the EITe's tax-based administration and does not at-
tempt to analyze or to quantify the claimed administrative and other advantages of tax-based
programs, such as the reduction in administrative costs or the alleviation of stigma. This Article
does argue, however, that an analysis of the claimed administrative savings should take into ac-
count the limitations described here: for example, is a tax-based program really "cheaper" if these
institutional constraints hinder its performance?
130 The analysis in this Part draws on a body of excellent work on institutional aspects of the
negative income tax. See GREEN, supra note 6, at 82-112; Michael R. Asimow & William A.
Klein, The Negative Income Tax: Accounting Problems and a Proposed Solution, 8 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. I (1970); William A. Klein, The Definition of "Income" Under a Negative Income Tax, 2
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 449 (1974); Klein, supra note 108; William D. Popkin, Administration of a
Negative Income Tax, 78 YALE L.J. 388 (1969); James Tobin, Joseph A. Pechman & Peter M.
Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L.J. I (1967).
131 See, e.g., Janet Holtzblatt, Administering Refundable Tax Credits: Lessons From the EITC
Experience, in 84 NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION - TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA PROCEEDINGS
180, 181-83 (1991); George K. Yin, John K. Scholz, Jonathan B. Forman & Mark J. Mazur, Im-
proving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax
Credit, II AM. J. TAX POL'y 225, 260-94 (1994)·
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burdens and income-transfer benefits appropriately. Much legal schol-
arship on tax policy addresses ways to make more precise the defini-
tion of income. Analogous issues confront social scientists who
attempt to measure income for statistical purposes. 132 Analytically, the
problem of income measurement consists of at least four issues: How
should income be defined? How should we group individuals into
families for purposes of measuring income? Over what period should
we measure income? What steps should we take to ensure compliance
with the income measurement rules we establish? Answering each
question requires some compromise among important objectives, and,
not surprisingly, the existing income tax and transfer systems often
strike different balances.
The divergence between the two systems may at first seem unwar-
ranted: why should the tax and transfer systems adopt different mea-
sures of income? In theory, the two income measures should be the
same, because both systems seek to assess economic resources accu-
rately to determine the contribution to be made to or received from
society. The unified tax-transfer model illustrated in Part 11133 be-
comes impossibly muddled if the measures of income used in the tax
and transfer systems are not comparable.
This view is too simple, however. The analysis in this Part shows
that the different approaches to income measurement in the tax and
transfer systems may well be defensible, even productive, responses to
the different goals and characteristics of each system. This argument
challenges the easy case for tax-transfer integration by showing that
there may be reasons to maintain separate systems. Traditional trans-
fer programs and tax-based transfer programs face similar trade offs
among important goals in measuring income. Each system, for exam-
ple, must balance the desirability of a comprehensive definition of in-
come against the cost of administering such a definition. The tax and
transfer systems have, over time, struck different compromises in re-
sponse to these trade offs. Consequently, any transfer program that
adopts the tax system's rules and procedures necessarily strikes a dif-
ferent balance than traditional transfer programs do. Further, these
different institutional choices make tax-based programs less accurate in
tailoring benefits to need, less responsive to changing needs, and less
132 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 29, at 82-99; ROBERT
HAVEMAN, POVERTY POLICY AND POVERTY RESEARCH 57-66 (1987); PATRICIA RUGGLES, DRAW-
ING THE LINE: ALTERNATIVE POVERTY MEASURES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POL-
ICY 89-162 (1990).
133 See Graph 2, supra p. 543; supra note 41. If existing tax institutions foster inaccuracy,
unresponsiveness, and noncompliance, why do they remain acceptable for tax purposes? Tracing
the historical, political, and other reasons for divergence in the tax and transfer systems is beyond
the scope of this Article. A historical explanation is also unnecessary to my argument, which is
based on a description of current institutions: although a hypothetical tax system could easily
accommodate tax-transfer integration, our current system would require major changes to do so.
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capable of enforcing compliance than their traditional counterparts.
The fundamental dilemma of tax-transfer integration is that reforms to
alleviate these limitations necessarily require either compromising tax-
transfer integration or undertaking wholesale reform of the tax system.
For example, although in theory the tax system might adopt the more
comprehensive definitions of income characteristic of traditional in-
come transfer programs, such a change in the tax law would be dis-
ruptive, expensive, and probably politically unacceptable.
Alternatively, the tax system might adopt separate, welfare-like rules
and procedures solely for purposes of a tax-based transfer program,
but that approach would tend to undermine the purported advantages
of integration. 134
A recognition of these dilemmas does not require the rejection of
the EITC or other tax-based transfer programs, but it does caution
against assuming that tax-based programs are uncomplicated or
unquestionably desirable. Implementing the "simple" vision of an inte-
grated tax and transfer system would require radical and costly
changes in the tax system - changes the advocates of tax-transfer in-
tegration rarely discuss.
One might question whether these income-measurement criteria are
appropriate for evaluating the EITC. If we view the EITC as an
earnings subsidy - intended only to "make work pay" - rather than
as a traditional transfer program, perhaps these limitations are unim-
portant. For example, inaccuracy in awarding EITC benefits may be
less troubling if the goal is to encourage work rather than to provide
benefits to a sharply defined group of very poor recipients, as with
welfare. After all, the EITC already differs significantly from tradi-
tional welfare programs in that it provides nothing to nonworkers and
little to those with very low earnings. One might argue that the ap-
propriate analogues are the minimum wage and macroeconomic poli-
cies aimed at full employment; those policies, like the EITC, also
promote welfare objectives by increasing the earnings capability of the
poor, but we do not evaluate them using the same criteria we apply to
welfare programs. 135
The assertion that the EITC is a work incentive program that
should not be evaluated using income measurement criteria raises seri-
ous questions about the proper gauge of performance for public poli-
cies, but the premise is slightly too simple. The EITC, as we now
know it, serves more than one purpose. 136 It is an earnings subsidy,
134 See infra pp. 574, 583.
135 I am indebted to Joel Handler for raising this important issue.
136 Cf THEODORE R. MARMOR, JERRY L. MASHAW & PHILIP L. HARVEY, AMERICA'S MISUN-
DERSTOOD WELFARE STATE 222-28 (1990) (arguing that social welfare programs do not have
unitary purposes). Steuerle and Wilson noted some of the multiple purposes of the EITC in a
1988 article and observed that, if the EITC is welfare, it falls short in some important ways. See
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intended to encourage work among the poor. The EITC is simulta-
neously, however, a redistributive program that provides income sup-
port for the working poor, under income-testing rules that purport to
target the assistance to low-income families. This dual aim is, ostensi-
bly, the EITC's advantage over the minimum wage and other
broadly-targeted policies: the EITC holds out the promise of stimulat-
ing work while providing extra earnings only to those who really need
them. 137 The EITC's redistributive goals suggest that traditional con-
cerns about accuracy, responsiveness, and compliance have an impor-
tant place in assessing the benefits and costs of the EITC's tax-based
administration. 138 In other words, although it is possible to conceive
of the EITC as purely an earnings subsidy, with few pretensions to
redistributive accuracy, responsiveness, or compliance, the EITC has
not in fact been designed or promoted in that manner. Particularly in
the 1990S, as the EITC has expanded beyond its traditional role as an
offset to payroll taxes, its income-support function has become increas-
ingly significant. 139
Eugene Steuerle & Paul Wilson, The Taxation of Poor and Lower-Income Workers, 2I CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 1047, 1054-55 (1987).
137 See, e.g., BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 101, at 149-50.
138 Of course, concerns of accuracy and responsiveness may not be as important in the EITC
as in welfare. EITC recipients, by definition, have at least some wage income and thus may be in
less dire need than some welfare recipients. In addition, the current EITC awards a significant
portion of its benefits to families with incomes higher than those of welfare recipients. See
Scholz, supra note 62, at 77. On the other hand, some EITC families are as poor as some welfare
recipients and others still have relatively low incomes, so that the income support the EITC pro-
vides may be crucial for basic necessities. See, e.g., Changes to EITC Could Alleviate H omeless-
ness, Council Says, 33 TAX ANALYSTS' DAILY TAX HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 2519, 2520
(1994). To the extent that future welfare reforms limit access to other sources of support, the
accurate and responsive delivery of the EITC may become even more important.
139 The legislative history of the EITC shows that its redistributive function has been impor-
tant since its enactment. The early legislative history of the EITC describes the program largely
as a work incentive and as an offset to payroll taxes but also clearly anticipates that the EITC
will be targeted to low-income families. See, e.g., S. PRT. No. 169, vol. I, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
859 (1984); S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6761, 6814-15 (noting that the EITC is targeted to "low-income families who might otherwise
receive large welfare payments"); S. REp. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975), reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 54, 83-84 (indicating that the EITC should be targeted to low-income individ-
uals because encouraging work should help reduce the welfare rolls).
Amendments to the EITC in 1990 increased the credit's redistributive function by raising the
EITC to a level that exceeded federal payroll taxes and by adjusting the EITC for family size.
These amendments recognized (in part) the different income support needs of families of different
sizes. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §IIIII, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-408 to -413, amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 312 , 433-35 (1993) (codified at lR.C. § 32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993»;
I.R.C. § 3IoI(a), (b) (1988) (mandating a payroll tax of 7.65 % for 1990, a percentage less than the
credit percentages provided in the 1990 Act). The legislative history of the EITC since 1990 also
characterizes the program as a work incentive but emphasizes even more strongly the income
support aspects of the program. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. I I I, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 609 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 840; H.R. REP. No. 881, 10lSt Cong., 2d Sess. 279 (1990),
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Further, even if we could agree to evaluate the EITC only as an
earnings subsidy, it is not clear that these income-measurement criteria
would be much less important. Ideally, the EITC earnings subsidy
should accurately reach the low-income workers (and potential work-
ers) it is intended to motivate. An earnings subsidy also should be
responsive in order to transmit its incentives effectively.140 Compli-
ance is crucial as well, because the earnings subsidy will not produce
the intended behavioral effects if it is available, for instance, to
nonworkers who falsely claim earnings.
The question of the appropriate criteria for judging the EITC does,
however, underscore the importance of evaluating the EITC in rela-
tion to other institutions. The EITC is part of a larger social welfare
system that provides other means of ensuring responsive assistance to
poor families. Accordingly, the accuracy and responsiveness of the
EITC may be of somewhat less concern than if it were the sole form
of income support available to the poor. The corollary, however, is
that, as the EITC expands to assume a larger role in U.S. social wel-
fare policy, these concerns are likely to grow in importance. Plans for
welfare reform may put even greater weight on the redistributive func-
tion of the EITC by eliminating other social welfare programs. My
point is not that the EITC must maximize responsiveness, accuracy,
and compliance. Instead, as Part V discusses, we may choose to scale
down our expectations of the EITC and recognize that its virtues
come at a price. This normative shift, however, would be a significant
one.
B. The Conflict Between Tax-Transfer Integration and Accurate
Measurement of Need
Definitions of "income" and "family" are fundamental to the task of
income measurement. The income definition determines which items
are counted. The more comprehensive the income definition, the bet-
ter a proxy "income" is for "economic resources." The family definition
controls whose income is counted in evaluating the economic resources
of a household. Completely accurate definitions of either "income" or
"family" would require individualized determinations,141 which would
be prohibitively costly. Consequently, both income tax and income-
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2281; 136 CONGo REC. 515629, S15684-85 (daily ed. Oct.
18, 1990).
140 See infra Part IV.C.
141 For example, a comprehensive measure of income would include the imputed rental value
of an owner-occupied home. Because real estate is unique, however, the imputed rental value of
each home would have to be determined separately, as would the deductible costs of maintenance
and depreciation. Similarly, determining the true "family" unit based on resource-pooling and
expense-sharing would require a personalized inquiry into family finances and actual spending
patterns.
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transfer systems adopt standardized definitions and sacrifice some pre-
cision for administrative savings. The federal income tax system
adopts definitions of income and family that are narrower than those
used in income-transfer programs and so tends to measure income
with less accuracy.142 Therefore, the trade off between accuracy and
administrative costs takes on a new twist in the EITC and other tax-
based transfer programs. In determining the proper trade off, these
programs are constrained by the compromises already built into the
federal income tax system. Thus, the claimed pecuniary and dignitary
advantages of tax-transfer integration come at the expense of adopting
the inaccurate rules of the federal income tax.
I. Defining "Income." - Income as reported for federal income
tax purposes understates "economic" income in important ways.143 For
example, the income definition excludes certain fringe benefits, im-
puted income from property and services, interest on obligations of
state and local governments, and a significant portion of income from
capital investments. 144 In addition, the income tax does not measure
wealth and so cannot comprehensively assess total economic re-
sources. 145 The current EITC phases out benefits using the tax code's
definition of income (with minor modifications) and does not incorpo-
rate a wealth requirement of any kind. 146 As a consequence, taxpayers
with significant wealth or excludable capital income may qualify, quite
142 See infra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
143 There are several definitions of "income" for federal income tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 61
(1988) (gross income); id. § 62 (1988 & Supp. V 1994) (adjusted gross income); id. § 63 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (taxable income). Even gross income, the broadest measure, falls well short of
economic income.
144 See, e.g., id. § 103 (1988); id. § 105 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); id. § 132 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). The exclusion of the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing and other consumer
durables is not made pursuant to any Code section but is embedded in the tax law as adminis-
tered. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 23 (1994). The federal income
tax law's definition of gross income often dramatically understates income derived from capital,
for example, by excluding gain on inherited property, see I.R.C. § 1014 (1988), or deferring in-
come through "accelerated" depreciation, see id. § 168 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The federal in-
come tax rules may also overstate income from capital, for example, by failing to adjust asset
basis for inflation. See generally William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Per-
sonal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1974) (arguing that the federal income tax sys-
tem's "worst inequity, distortion, and complexity arise out of inconsistency in the treatment of
accumulation").
145 The federal estate and gift tax is a tax on wealth that applies only to the richest households
and only at the time of transfer. See I.R.C. §§ 2001-2663 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
146 The EITC's earnings subsidy is based on "earned income," but the EITC's income test
reduces benefits based on the greater of earned income or adjusted gross income (AGI). AGI
includes all taxable sources of income, and earned income includes taxable and nontaxable com-
pensation for services. See id. §§ 32(C)(2), 62 (Supp. V 1993); Treas. Reg. § I.32-2(C)(2) (as
amended 1992).
572 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 108:533
legally, for EITC benefits, which they would not receive if the Code
measured income (and wealth) more accurately.147
In contrast, traditional income-transfer programs tailored to need
make relatively comprehensive assessments of income and wealth.
Most programs attempt to measure all sources of cash available to
meet the living expenses of a family, with limited deductions for ex-
penses. 148 The programs typically consider the value of assets as well
as income to assess accurately the need for benefits. 149
Recent scholarship has paid little attention to the issue of income
definition for the EITC.150 In contrast, economists and legal scholars
147 See infra p. 575-76. The issue is not that poor people are understating their incomes by
claiming accelerated depreciation or shifting assets into municipal bonds. Truly poor people do
not have assets of that kind. The issue is that non-poor people may "look" poorer than they are
on the basis of their income reported for tax purposes. See Cherie J. O'Neil & Linda B. Nelses-
tuen, The Earned Income Credit: The Need For a Wealth Restriction for Eligibility Determina-
tion, 63 TAX NOTES 1189, 1199-200 (1994) (describing one EITC recipient who received tax-
exempt interest income of $187,000). In addition, the exclusion of some items, like imputed rent
and transfer payments, may weaken the federal income tax system's ability to draw distinctions
among the poor.
148 AFDC, for example, generally counts most cash receipts, including gifts and child support
in excess of certain nominal amounts, as income. The income and resources rules are complex
and may vary from state to state. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (1993). For a
description of AFDC income rules, see Adele M. Blong & Timothy J. Casey, AFDC Program
Rules for Advocates: An Overview, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 8i4, 881-84 (1991); and 1994 GREEN
BOOK, cited above in note 2, at 327-30. For SSI and Food Stamp income rules, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382a (1988); and 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1988), respectively. For descriptions of these rules, see 1994
GREEN BOOK, cited above in note 2, at 213-14,763-65. Welfare programs' income definitions are
not necessarily more comprehensive in all respects than the income tax rules. For example, the
welfare rules generally look to cash receipts rather than to economic accrual of income and so are
less sophisticated and comprehensive in their treatment of, among other things, original issue dis-
count. Cf I.R.C. § 1272(a) (1988) (requiring current inclusion in income of original issue discount).
In general, however, the welfare rules are better targeted to measuring cash resources available
for current consumption, particularly among low-income families. Welfare programs' eligibility
rules have been criticized as so complex that, when misunderstood, they may result in denial of
benefits to eligible claimants. See BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 101, at 125-27. My intention is
not to exaggerate the accuracy or other virtues of traditional welfare administration, but to point
out that, in a tax-based program, there are potentially significant inaccuracies even if administra-
tors and benefit recipients strictly follow the rules. Issues of administrative error and non-compli-
ance - in the EITC and welfare - are analytically distinct.
149 AFDC requires eligible households to have resources of less than $1,000. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(7)(B) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3) (1993). "Resources" under AFDC include most as-
sets, with exclusions for certain homes, some personal items like clothes and furniture, and up to
$1,500 for one car. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3) (1993). The Food
Stamp program resource limit is $2000 ($3,000 for households with an elderly member), with
exclusions for certain cars and homes. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(g) (Supp. V. 1993); 7 C.F.R. § 273.8
(1994). Although these rules exclude some potentially valuable assets, even a limited asset test
enhances the accuracy of measurement of need, because assets, like income, can fund the
purchase of goods and services.
150 There has been no sustained effort to consider the implications of the narrow federal in-
come tax definition of income for the EITC, although several scholars have mentioned the issue.
See Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 136, at 1054-55; Jonathan B. Forman, Improving the Earned
Income Credit: Transition to a Wage Subsidy Credit for the Working Poor, 16 FLA. ST. U. L.
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who studied the negative income tax plans of the 1960s and 1970S
unanimously advocated a comprehensive income definition for pur-
poses of the negative income tax, with the goal of coming as close to
economic income as possible. 1s 1 James Tobin, for example, argued in
1968 that:
Taxable income as defined for the federal income tax is so poor a defini-
tion of need that to use it as the base for negative income tax payments
would be a travesty of common sense and good justice. Society does not
want to pay benefits to people with low taxable income but with ample
resources - wealth, tax-exempt interest, capital gains, pensions, social
security stipends, college fellowships, large itemized deductions, gift re-
ceipts, and so on. 1S2
Tobin's statement emphasizes the inevitability of the trade off: if
constrained to use the federal income tax's income definition, the
EITC and other tax-based transfers may award benefits inappropri-
ately. The preferred solution of Tobin and others, however, is also
problematic, and it illustrates the fundamental dilemma of tax-transfer
integration. Adopting an expanded income definition solely for EITe
purposes is likely to compromise the benefits of tax-transfer integra-
tion. Separate rules would increase the administrative cost and com-
plexity of the program and could reduce the dignitary advantages of
uniform procedures. This trade off creates a continuum of possible
solutions. At one extreme lies a completely integrated EITC that fully
incorporates the tax system's limited definitions; at the other extreme,
a separate set of rules and procedures for the EITC could come to
resemble a "mini-welfare program" run by the IRS.
In the middle are numerous possible compromises between integra-
tion and separation. For example, the Code might adopt a slightly
broader definition of income to be used in tax provisions, like the
REV. 41, 84, 87-89 (1988); see also The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals,
Hearings Before the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Ways and Means, Part 6, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3568 (1978) (paper of Sheldon Danziger & Jonathan R. Kesselman) (arguing that
the adoption of refundable tax credits heightens the need for expanded tax reform); Jonathan R.
Kesselman, Income Security via the Tax System: Canadian and American Reforms, in CANADA-
U.S. TAX COMPARISONS 97, 128-29 Gohn B. Shoven & John Whalley eds., 1992) (analyzing argu-
ments for a broader income definition for tax-based transfers).
151 See GREEN, supra note 6, at 82-99, 165-66; Heineman Comm'n Proposal, Report of the
President's Comm'n on Income Maintenance Programs, reprinted in POVERTY POLICY: A COM-
PENDIUM OF CASH TRANSFER PROPOSALS, 183, 197-99 (Theodore R. Marmor ed., 1971); Klein,
supra note 130, at 459-87; Popkin, supra note 130, at 388, 389-4°3; Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkow-
ski, supra note 130, at 11-14.
152 James Tobin, Raising the Incomes of the Poor, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 113 (Kermit
Gordon ed., 1968) (footnote omitted). Although the federal income tax base is probably more
comprehensive now than in 1968, thanks in large part to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N (100 Stat.) 2085-961, all of the items Tobin mentions remain eligi-
ble for some degree of preferential treatment.
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EITC, that require more accurate income measurement. 153 Such a
definition might, for instance, include tax-exempt interest income or
disallow· business losses in determining total earnings. 154 The EITC's
"earned income" definition illustrates, however, that even a relatively
modest change may compromise tax-transfer integration. This defini-
tion, which includes some non-taxable items, is a relatively small de-
parture from the normal income tax rules. Nevertheless, critics have
charged that the deviation from standard tax rules creates administra-
tive uncertainty for both the IRS and for EITe recipients and may
encourage noncompliance. 155
Major reforms of the federal income tax could reconcile tax-trans-
fer integration with more accurate income measurement, but such
changes pose a formidable political challenge. The Tax Reform Act of
1986156 probably illustrates the outer boundaries of feasible expansions
of the federal income tax base.157 Further, administrative as well as
political considerations effectively limit reform. Without dramatic (and
expensive) changes in the tax system's institutional structure or in in-
formation reporting requirements for the private sector, the federal in-
come tax system cannot comprehensively measure income.
If the conflict between accurate income redistribution and tax-
transfer integration in the EITe were unimportant in practical terms,
we might well ignore it. If, for example, only a small portion of the
program's total cost were attributable to mismeasurement of need, we
might be unconcerned. Alternatively, even if the dollar "leakage" were
153 See, e.g., Forman, supra note ISO, at 83-84. Such a definition might be useful not only for
the EITC, but also, for example, for purposes of the income tests that determine the taxability of
Social Security benefits, the amount of the dependent care tax credit, and similar provisions.
154 See O'Neil & Nelsestuen, supra note 147, at 1200.
155 The earned income definition has been criticized as promoting fraud in the EITC program,
and some analysts have proposed returning to pre-1978 law. See Yin, Scholz, Forman & Mazur,
supra note 131, at 267-68. An alternative is to take steps to enhance the administrability of the
earned income definition. See, e.g., S. 2224, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 909, reprinted in 140 CONGo
REc. S7318 (daily ed. June 21, 1994) (requiring the Department of Defense to report nontaxable
amounts of earned income to the IRS and to employees). Another example is the expanded in-
come definition that Minnesota uses for purposes of its low-income credits: although the income
measure includes AFDC receipts and other nontaxable income, analysts note the difficulty of veri-
fying these amounts. See Paul Wilson & Robert Cline, State Welfare Reform: Integrating Tax
Credits and Income Transfers, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 655, 673.
156 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N (100 Stat.) 2085-961.
157 See generally JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, TAX REFORM, THE RICH AND THE POOR 86-88 (1989)
(describing changes made in 1986). It is possible but seems unlikely that the existence of a larger
EITC program could encourage measures to expand the federal tax base or could constrain fur-
ther erosion of the tax base by raising the cost of tax preferences. Although the EITC is large for
a transfer program, its roughly $26 billion annual cost is small relative to the size of the income
tax system as a whole and is not even particularly large for a tax expenditure. Cf 1994 GREEN
BOOK, supra note 2, at 677-79 (noting that, in 1994, the individual federal income tax raised
approximately $540 billion and that approximate tax expenditures for fiscal year 1995 include $46
billion for the home mortgage interest deduction and $54 billion for the exclusion for employer-
provided health insurance).
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significant in size, we might still be unconcerned if the beneficiaries
were either EITC-eligible families who simply receive too large a
credit or EITC-ineligible families with incomes only slightly over the
EITC income cutoff.
Available data suggest that the problem of income mismeasurement
is not large but not insignificant. For 1994, a Joint Committee on Tax-
ation aCT) distributional table based on an expanded definition of in-
come aCT expanded income) indicates that some families with JCT
expanded incomes of as much as $50,000 to $75,000 per year receive
the EITC.158 Further, although a precise calculation using published
data is impossible, a rough but reasonable calculation suggests that the
percentage of total EITC benefits paid to recipients with JCT ex-
panded income in excess of the program's statutory income cutoff is
between three and six percent - a small but non-trivial figure. 159
The three percent figure represents families with incomes of $30,000 or
more (that is, more than $4500 over the 1994 income cutoft). These
data do not indicate the magnitude of "overpayments" among EITC-
eligible families.
Preliminary evidence also suggests that the absence of an EITe
wealth test may have a significant effect. A study based on 1988 IRS
data shows that up to ten percent of EITC benefits in that year were
paid to taxpayers who apparently held investment assets in significant
amounts. 160 Extrapolating from this data, the authors conclude that
restricting EITC eligibility based on a modified wealth test could have
158 See 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 703 tbl. (indicating that about 23,000 families in
that income range received about $20 million in EITC benefits). The income cutoff for 1994 is
$25,300 because the 1993 legislative changes will not be fully phased in until 1996. See id. at
700; see also id. at 676 (describing the Joint Committee's expanded definition of income). The
only reason for the benefits paid to higher-income families is the inadequacy of the EITC income
definition; the tables do not incorporate overpayments due to noncompliance. Personal Communi-
cation from Mark J. Mazur, economist Gune 15, 1993).
159 Because the table is divided into income classes at $10,000 increments, it provides only an
aggregate figure for EITC benefits paid to families in the $20,000 to $30,000 range and does not
indicate what portion of those payments are made to families with expanded incomes in excess of
the 1994 EITC income cutoff of $25,3°0. The low percentage (2.73%) cited in the text reflects
EITC payments to families with expanded incomes of $30,000 or more ($537 million out of total
EITC benefits of $19,647 million). The high percentage (5.94%) cited in the text is based on an
arbitrary guess that 15 % of payments in the $20,000 to $30,000 expanded income range are made
to those with expanded incomes that exceed the EITC income cutoff level (for a total of $1 166
million out of total EITC benefits of $19,647 million). See id. at 703 tbl.
160 See O'Neil & Nelsestuen, supra note 147, at 1190. The authors use total investment in-
come (taxable and non-taxable), as reported on the tax return, as a proxy for wealth. In 1988,
10% of EITC benefits were paid to taxpayers reporting investment income of $300 or more. See
id. This study probably understates the problem, because it takes into account only income-
producing investment assets. Other limitations of the methodology exist as well. See id. at
1200-01.
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reduced the revenue cost of the 1993 EITC expansion by five
percent. 161
The problem of income measurement may grow as the EITC pro-
gram grows. For example, the 1993 expansion of the EITC increased
the income cutoff to $27,000. Including these relatively well-off fami-
lies in the EITC population may increase the number of EITC recipi-
ents with excludable forms of income.162 Further, the political impact
of "scandals" involving overpayments to high-income households may
be disproportionate to their financial magnitude. One can imagine a
politician hostile to the EITC trumpeting that "welfare" benefits are
being paid to families making $50,000 or $100,000 - even though the
size of those payments compared to the program as a whole is tiny.163
One final argument deserves mention. Many income-transfer pro-
grams, including the EITe, are designed to award some benefits to the
nonpoor in order to keep benefit reduction rates low. Why, then,
should policymakers be concerned about additional EITC benefits that
flow to the nonpoor due to the understatement of economic income?
The problem is that the two types of payments to the nonpoor may
differ significantly in their political visibility and their distributional
effect. Payments that result from extending eligibility for benefits
above the poverty line are immediately apparent in the design of the
program and are equally available to all who meet the eligibility crite-
ria and fall within the income range. Overpayments related to the
income definition, however, tend to be both hidden and arbitrarily dis-
tributed, because they are available only to those with tax-favored
sources of income.
2. Defining the "Family." - The definition of "family" creates
similar institutional dilemmas. The federal income tax rules adopt a
161 The authors acknowledge the difficulty of measuring wealth directly. The five percent fig-
ure is based on disallowing the EITC to taxpayers reporting investment income of more than
$1200 per year. See id. at 1200.
162 The Joint Committee on Taxation's distributional table for 1996 shows that at least six
percent of EITC benefits will be paid to families with expanded incomes greater than the EITC
income cutoff, then $28,524. See 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 703 (reporting that 5.81%
of EITC benefits will be paid to families with expanded incomes greater than $30,000). The
actual number is probably higher, because some families shown in the $20,000 to $30,000 income
range in the JCT table presumably have incomes that exceed $28,524.
163 The prototypical "horror story" is likely to be a wealthy person whose wealth is invested in
tax-exempt bonds or other tax-preferred assets. She might work short hours even at a relatively
high wage and still qualify for EITC benefits.
The EITC could be particularly vulnerable to these attacks, because overpayments due to
income mismeasurement occur even when the rules are being followed, in contrast to the typical
"welfare queen" stories about noncompliance. See, e.g., Seth Faison, Officials Say Woman on
Welfare Stole Thousands With Fake [D's, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at Bl; Woman's Aid Claims
for 38 Children Are Examined, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1980, at 31; see also EVELYN Z. BRODKIN,
THE FALSE PROMISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: IMPLEMENTING QUALITY CONTROL IN WEL-
FARE 24-40 (1986) (describing the "transition from a prevailing concern with poverty's causes and
cures to an overriding concern with welfare's costs and mismanagement").
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narrow definition of the family. Although current federal income tax
law' nominally treats the family rather than the individual as the tax-
able unit, the "family" for this purpose is best understood as the mar-
ried couple. Most husbands and wives have little reason to file
separate returns. Unmarried individuals must file separate returns re-
gardless of shared living or support arrangements. 164 A taxpayer may
claim personal exemptions for children and other dependents,165 but
the income of children and .other dependents generally is not reported
on the taxpayer's tax return. 166 In contrast, income-transfer programs
typically adopt a broader definition of family that includes most rela-
tives who live together. 167
The EITC follows the federal income tax in treating the married
couple as the basic family unit and in disregarding the income of other
household members. For purposes of determining benefits - but not
measuring income - the EITC takes into account a taxpayer's rela-
tionship to a child based on rules that differ somewhat from the "de-
pendency" definition used for regular tax purposes. 168 Although the
new rules adopted in 1990 were intended to improve accuracy and
compliance, they have come under attack for their complexity and po-
tential adverse effects on participation - and illustrate again the ten-
164 See I.R.C. § I(a), (d) (Supp. V 1993). The rate schedules and other rules are designed so
that there is rarely any advantage to separate filing by married couples. See id. (providing that
tax rate brackets for married individuals who file separately are half as wide as for married
couples who file jointly). Other provisions also help ensure that most married taxpayers will get
no benefit from filing separately. See, e.g., id. § 63(C)(6)(A) (1988) (denying the standard deduction
to married persons who file separately if either spouse itemizes deductions); id. § 68(b)(I) (Supp. V
1993) (providing that the phase-out of itemized deductions begins for a married person filing sepa-
rately at half the income level for married couples filing jointly).
165 See id. § 151 (Supp. V 1993). Dependency is established using a multi-factor test, including
support, relationship, age, gross income, and citizenship. See id. § 152 (1988). Single individuals
who "maintain[] a household" for children or certain dependents, id. § 2(b) (1988), are eligible for
"head of household" filing status, which confers an advantageous tax rate schedule and certain
other advantages. [d. § I(b) (Supp. V 1993).
166 Unearned income of minor children that exceeds a threshold is taxed at the parent's mar-
ginal tax rate, and parents can elect, in some cases, to report the child's income on their return.
See id. § I(g) (Supp. V 1993).
167 Very generally, under AFDC, the family unit includes the parents of a dependent child and
any dependent full- or half-siblings living in the home. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A), (a)(38) (1988
& Supp. V 1993); 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(a)(I)(vii) (1993); Blong & Casey, supra note 148, at 881-82.
SSI aggregates only the incomes of married couples and provides certain adjustments to take
account of support provided by other household members. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382a (1988); 1994
GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 217-18. The Food Stamp program uses a comprehensive defini-
tion of "familY" that generally includes all members of a household who purchase food and pre-
pare meals together. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (Supp. V 1993); OHLS & BEEBOUT, supra note 64, at
22-25·
168 Compare I.R.C. § 32(C)(3) (Supp. V. 1993) (defining "qualifying child" for purposes of deter-
mining EITC eligibility) with I.R.C. § 152(a) (1988) (defining "dependent").
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sion between tax-transfer integration and reforms to improve the
EITC's performance. 169
Whether the EITC's rather narrow family definition distorts the
desired pattern of income redistribution to any significant degree is an
empirical question. Unfortunately, no publicly available data shed
light on the magnitude of the problem. 170 In principle, however, the
failure to define family in a realistic way is as troubling as the exclu-
sion of certain sources of income. Careful program design might miti-
gate but cannot eliminate the potential inaccuracy. 171 For example,
the EITC pays the largest benefits to working families with children
and provides benefits for childless workers only between the ages of
twenty-five and sixty-five. 172 These rules tend to improve accurate
targeting in a rough way, by excluding elderly people and teenagers -
two groups who are particularly likely to live in households in which
they receive support from others.
Adopting truly precise family definition rules for purposes of the
EITC would, even if desirable, be administratively difficult. Presump-
tions of financial support and of shared expenses within a household
are difficult to formulate and to defend. 173 Although the federal in-
169 For criticism of the new rules, see Part IV.n below. The problems that prompted the
adoption of special EITC rules in 1990 illustrate how family definitions that function reasonably
well as applied to many taxpayers may prove inadequate for a tax-based transfer program.
Before 1990, IRS compliance studies showed that a large percentage of EITC recipients were in
fact ineligible for the EITC, and overpayments were associated with errors in filing status or
dependency claims. See Holtzblatt, supra note 13 I, at 183. Low-income families often receive a
significant percentage of their income in the form of transfer payments. See 1994 GREEN BOOK,
supra note 2, at 1144-47. Although such payments are not taxable, they can defeat a "depen-
dency" or "household maintenance" determination, and result under pre-199° law in denial of the
EITC. See Yin, Scholz, Forman & Mazur, supra note 131, at 271.
170 The JCT distribution tables use the tax filing unit as the "family" unit and so generally do
not capture the extent to which the EITC overpays benefits due to the narrow family definition.
See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 29, at 97.
171 The EITC adopts additional eligibility rules to minimize awards of the EITC based on
inadequate family definitions; these rules do not necessarily increase the theoretical accuracy of
the EITC's family unit rules, but they do minimize revenue loss. For example, an adult single
parent who earns low wages but lives with her middle-class parents would be ineligible for the
EITC under the Code. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(I)(C) (Supp. V 1993). Under that rule, because her child
would be a "qualifying child" for her parents too, her parents' higher AGI would preclude her
from claiming the EITC. [d. § 32(C)(I)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
In theory, an alternative to expanding the definition of "family" for income measurement pur-
poses is to require all individuals or married couples to include in their income the support they
receive from others, but such a proposal would require a major change in federal income tax law
and would raise issues of administrability. Scholars of the negative income tax typically recom-
mended both expanding in some way the definition of the family and including at least some
support payments in income. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 130, at 459-63; Popkin, supra note 130,
at 392-95, 403-09; Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski, supra note 130, at 9-11 , 13-14.
172 See I.R.C. § 32 (b), (C)(I )(A) (Supp. V 1993).
173 For example, not all married couples share expenses and pool resources, even if they live
together. See Gann, supra note 108, at 26 & n.97; Munnell, supra note 121, at 266. The situation
of unmarried people living together is even more complicated because cohabitation outside mar-
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come tax system as a whole may eventually have to adapt to the reali-
ties of changing American family structures, virtually no one now
advocates or anticipates the expansion of the tax system's family defi-
nition. 174 Once again, then, the goal of tax-transfer integration con-
strains both the current effectiveness of the EITC and efforts to
improve its performance.
C. The Conflict Between Tax-Transfer Integration and
Responsiveness to Changing Circumstances
Because incomes fluctuate - sometimes dramatically - as jobs
are won and lost, wages and hours worked change, and marriages
form and dissolve, the measurement interval is important. The length
of the accounting period affects the aggregate amount of taxes col-
lected or transfers paid in any system in which marginal tax rates
vary. 175 Under the regressive marginal tax rate structure characteristic
of the EITC and other income-tested transfer programs,176 shorter ac-
counting periods tend to favor those with fluctuating incomes: their
benefits are likely to "be higher, in the aggregate, than those of individ-
uals with steady incomes. 177 Under the federal income tax, in contrast,
riage comprises a wide variety of relationships, and distinguishing arrangements in which support
is present from those in which support is absent is likely to prove impossible without individual-
ized determination of a kind that current tax procedures cannot accommodate. See Klein, supra
note 108, at 401 (concluding that "no set of rules will be perfectly adapted to all conceivable
circumstances").
174 In fact, proposals for reform in the last 15 years have typically advocated filing by each
individual, without regard to marital status. See, e.g., Harvey E. Brazer, Income Tax Treatment
of the Family, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, supra note 121, at 223, 238-45; Gann, supra
note 108, at 67-69; Julie A. Nelson, Tax Reform and Feminist Theory in the United States: Incor-
porating Human Connection, 18 ]. ECON. STUD. II, 18-27 (1991); June O'Neill, Family Issues in
Taxation, in TAXING THE FAMILY I, 18-19 (Rudolph G. Penner ed., 1983).
175 Fluctuating incomes would not affect taxation in a system with a constant marginal tax
rate. See Kesselman, supra note I I I, at 228. For an excellent discussion of the issues posed by
fluctuating incomes in income-transfer programs, see Asimow & Klein, cited above in note 130, at
6-10.
176 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (demonstrating the EITC's regressive marginal
tax rates). See generally Kesselman, supra note I I I, at 221-26 (describing accounting problems in
a negative income tax). The EITC creates a regressive marginal rate structure for incomes that
fluctuate "between the phase-out range and the range of incomes above the income cutoff line.
Consequently, the EITC tends to award greater benefits to those with incomes that fluctuate
between these ranges. An EITC recipient whose earnings fluctuate within the phase-in range or
within the phase-out range will find that benefits are neither understated nor overstated, because
the marginal tax rate (the earnings subsidy rate or phase-out) is constant. A worker whose earn-
ings fluctuate between the phase-in and phase-out ranges may be overpaid or underpaid.
177 For example, suppose there are two periods (one and two), and the taxpayer earns $10 in
period one and $25 in period two. A hypothetical transfer program provides a maximum benefit
of five dollars, a benefit reduction rate of 33 %, and an income cutoff of $15. Incomes greater
than $15 but no greater than $30 are subject to income tax at a marginal tax rate of 10%. If
income is measured (and benefits are awarded) for each period, the taxpayer will receive a benefit
of $1.70 in period one. She will receive no transfer benefits in period two and will owe positive
income tax of one dollar. Her net transfer for the two periods would be $0.70. In contrast, a
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marginal tax rates rise with income and produce a progressive mar-
ginal income tax rate structure, which tends to impose higher total tax
burdens on those with fluctuating incomes than on those with steady
incomes.
Ideally, a tax or transfer system would both respond quickly to
changing circumstances and react only to real changes in economic
well-being. 178 In practice, however, the two goals conflict. Respon-
siveness implies immediate adjustment to short-term changes, but ac-
curate income measurement implies waiting to evaluate the
permanency of the change in circumstances. Longer accounting inter-
vals, as in the federal income tax, more accurately evaluate the perma-
nency of change and thus tend to reduce the impact of fluctuating
incomes. 179 Thaditional income-transfer programs, in contrast, typi-
cally measure income at much shorter intervals, usually monthly, in
order to maximize responsiveness to changing circumstances.180
The EITC, as a tax-based program, is thus inherently unresponsive
relative to traditional transfer programs. Is this unresponsiveness a
problem? One might argue that a degree of sluggishness in traditional
income transfers could be beneficial, because it encourages work effort.
Delays in awarding traditional benefits may discourage voluntary deci-
sions to leave employment, and delays in eliminating benefits may re-
ward initial efforts to find and hold a job. 181 Unresponsiveness may
impose real hardship on those for whom unemployment is involuntary,
however, and may expend scarce resources on those who are no longer
needy. In addition, unresponsiveness in the EITC, in contrast to
traditional transfer programs, could, in some cases, discourage work
by delaying transmittal of the EITC's earnings subsidy.182 The prob-
taxpayer with steady income ($17.5° in each period) would receive no benefits and would pay
income tax of $0.25 in each period, for a net tax of $0.50. If income were measured (and benefits
were awarded) only at the end of period two (and the income cutoff, income tax threshold, and
maximum benefit levels were doubled), both individuals would report income of $35, neither
would receive benefits, and each would owe total income tax of $0.50.
178 This section addresses "responsiveness" in only the rather narrow sense of temporal respon-
siveness, that is, how quickly benefits are awarded or taken away if the program functions ac-
cording to its legal terms.
179 Although the federal income tax system adopts an annual accounting period, it requires
payment at more frequent intervals in order to ensure current payment of a high percentage of
the year's tax. See I.R.C. §§ 3402, 6654, 6655 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Unfortunately, the relative
accuracy of the federal income tax system's rules in measuring income over time does not offset
the inaccuracy of its definitions of income and family. The federal income tax simply does a
relatively accurate job of measuring income as inaccurately defined.
180 Welfare programs typically require monthly reporting for at least some recipients (often
those with earnings or a work history, because their income is more likely to fluctuate). See 7
U.S.C. § 2015(c) (1988) (Food Stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c) (SSI); id. § 602(a)(13), (14) (1988)
(AFDC).
181 See Asimow & Klein, supra note 130, at 10.
182 In theory, the EITC's unresponsiveness would not affect its incentives if people anticipate
receipt of the EITC and understand the link between work effort and the receipt of the EITC.
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lem appears increasingly serious as the income support function of the
credit expands and the EITC grows from several hundred to several
thousand dollars a year. 183
Congress attempted in 1978 to enhance the responsiveness of the
EITC by enacting the "advance payment" rules, which permit periodic
payment of the EITC by employers throughout the year. 184 Recipients
of advance payments must file a tax return at the end of the year. If
advance payments received exceed the EITC computed at year end,
the recipient must repay the excess to the government. 18S Available
data indicate that the advance payment option is rarely used. A 1992
General Accounting Office study shows that fewer than one-half of
one percent of EITC recipients chose the advance payment option in
1989.186 Although the advance payment system is plagued by numer-
ous administrative problems,187 one central reason that EITC recipi-
ents avoid advance payments is that they quite rationally fear a year-
end tax liability due to overpayment of benefits during the year. 188
Some analysts, however, have expressed concern that receiving the EITC in a lump sum at the
year's end, rather than more frequently throughout the year, obscures the connection between the
EITC and work. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6761, 6815; OLSON WITH DAVIS, supra note 55, at 9-13.
Some defenders of the EITC argue that annual receipt of the EITC enables poor families (like
many middle-class ones) to opt voluntarily for forced savings by deferring receipt of a refund or
EITC payment until the annual date. See SHAPIRO & GREENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 26. Seventy-
five percent of all taxpayers typically receive tax refunds due to overwithholding. See U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: ADVANCE PAYMENT OPTION IS NOT
WIDELY KNOWN OR UNDERSTOOD By THE PUBLIC 16 (GAO/GGD-92-26, Feb. 1992) [hereinafter
GAO ADVANCE PAYMENT REPORT]. There is evidence that some EITC recipients prefer annual
payment. See id. at 3; OLSON WITH DAVIS, supra note 55 at 10-II. Nevertheless, the unrespon-
siveness of the EITC continues to draw criticism.
183 See SHAPIRO & GREENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 26-28.
184 See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 105(b)(I), 92 Stat. 2763, 2773-76 (codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 3507 (1988». Under the advance payment rules, a worker who certifies to her
employer that she expects to be eligible for the EITC receives installment payments of the credit
each pay period, with each installment based on earnings for the pay period. See I.R.C. § 3507
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). These rules in effect assume that each pay period's earnings accurately
reflect a pro rata portion of total income for the year.
185 See I.R.C. § 32(g) (1988). Conversely, the taxpayer receives an additional credit if advance
payments fall short of the EITC as calculated on the return. See id.
186 See GAO ADVANCE PAYMENT REPORT, supra note 182, at 3.
187 The GAO found that many EITC recipients and their employers were unaware of the ad-
vance payment option and that there was widespread confusion and noncompliance when ad-
vance payments were made. See id.
188 See id. at 14. In fact, even people involved in EITC outreach are reluctant to promote the
advance payment option: the IRS is concerned about noncompliance, tax preparers prefer to max-
imize year-end refunds, and social workers worry about taxpayers' owing the IRS money at the
end of the year. See Stephen D. Holt, Improvement of the Advance Payment Option of the
Earned Income Credit, 57 TAX NOTES 1583, 1584 n.8 (1992). For families with stable low in-
comes, the absence of a workable advance payment feature may be "only" a first-year problem,
because the EITC received at the end of the first year can be spent all through the second year,
and so on. This view assumes, however, that families can rationally budget to use a lump sum
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In recent years, the EITC's lack of responsiveness has generated a
variety of proposals for reform. Some commentators propose programs
to improve awareness of and employer participation in the advance
payment program; others propose to curtail or to eliminate the ad-
vance payment option.189 What these critics have typically missed,
however, is that real improvement in the responsiveness of the EITC
is possible only at the cost of tax-transfer integration or of costly trans-
formation of existing tax institutions.
The basic problem is that the advance payment system (even if
successfully implemented) cannot avoid the underlying institutional di-
lemma. Advance payment creates the illusion of responsiveness, but it
cannot deliver true responsiveness as long as the EITC remains linked
to the annual accounting interval of the federal income tax. The fear
of EITC recipients that the advance payment system will leave them
owing money to the government at the end of the year is well-
founded. The short "accounting intervals of the advance payment sys-
tem tend to "overpay" benefits during the year to those with fluctuat-
ing incomes, and reconciliation at year end requires recipients to repay
the "excess" benefits they received. 190 Attempting to recapture such
overpayments may inflict hardship on the families involved. Even if
absolute amounts are small, they may be large in relative terms for
poor families. Collecting small amounts from relatively poor people
may also impose disproportionately high collection costs on the Inter-
throughout the year and ignores the rules that treat EITC refunds as "resources" for purposes of
determining eligibility for means-tested programs such as AFDC and Food Stamps if not spent
quickly. See supra note 40.
189 See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., FISCAL YEAR
1994 BUDGET RECONCILIATION RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 172
(Comm. Print 1993); GAO ADVANCE PAYMENT REPORT, supra note 182, at 5 (recommending that
the IRS take additional steps to increase awareness of the advance payment option); Holt, supra
note 188, at 1586-87; Yin, Scholz, Forman & Mazur, supra note 131, at 266, 274-78.
190 The analysis of the problem of recapturing EITC overpayments applies to EITC recipients
with incomes that fluctuate between the EITC phase-out range and the range of incomes above
the income cutoff. It is over this range that the combination of the EITC and the regular tax
system creates regressive marginal tax rates. EITC recipients with incomes (or earnings) that
fluctuate between other ranges may receive over- or underpayments. See supra note 176.
This structural recapture problem does not occur in the income tax system. The federal in-
come tax, like the EITC advance payment system, incorporates a disjunction between payment
periods and accounting periods by collecting tax at frequent intervals but determining final tax
liability measured on an annual basis. Because the positive income tax system has progressive
marginal tax rates, however, fluctuating incomes tend to result in overpayments rather than un-
derpayments of tax. Although underpayments requiring recapture certainly occur, they do not
typically result solely from fluctuating incomes.
The problem of recapture also is absent in traditional welfare programs, but for a different
reason. AFDC, SSI, and Food Stamps use a short accounting period with no recapture. Thus,
although "overpayments" measured on an annual basis inevitably occur, the rules of the programs
do not typically measure them or require repayment.
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nal Revenue Service: given the small "stakes" in any individual case,
the cost of IRS collection efforts may exceed the potential return.I 91
Only structural change would enhance the EITC's responsiveness.
The EITC could adopt a shorter accounting period without year-end
reconciliation, which is the approach used in traditional transfer pro-
grams. 192 This solution would require a separate set of rules that is
likely to compromise tax-transfer integration, however, because the tax
system itself continues to operate on an annual basis}93 Another way
of alleviating the problem would be to change the system of tax with-
holding. A "cumulative" system of withholding, like the system used
in the United Kingdom, would automatically adjust for fluctuating in-
comes of EITC recipients and regular taxpayers alike. 194 The com-
plexity of such a system makes it unlikely that employers would
realistically adopt it solely for EITC purposes, however, and conver-
sion of the U.S. income tax withholding system to a cumulative system
would be costly. Such a massive disruption of the federal income tax
system is unlikely to be undertaken solely to improve the EITC,
191 For example, the General Accounting Office found that the IRS cannot detect noncompli-
ance in time to prevent claimants from receiving the EITC both in advance and with the tax
return, and once the IRS does detect noncompliance, the General Accounting Office says that the
IRS is "unlikely" to recover much money. See GAO ADVANCE PAYMENT REPORT, supra note
182, at 24, 28. Two-earner couples and workers with non-wage income also are likely to receive
overpayments. See the examples in Holt, cited above in note 188, at 1585-86.
192 See Vin, Scholz, Forman & Mazur, supra note 131, at 276-77.
193 Cf Kesselman, supra note 150, at 129-33, 143 ("In concept, this deficiency [in the respon-
siveness of tax provisions] could be remedied through frequent periodic income reporting by bene-
ficiaries and corresponding adjustment of their benefits. But this would entail major
administrative resources and would not be easily accommodated within the personal tax system.").
The federal tax law requires individual and corporate taxpayers to make quarterly estimated tax
payments. See supra note 179. These quarterly returns, however, do not provide a ready vehicle
for shorter EITC accounting periods because they operate only to require prepayment of tax that
is determined finally on the annual tax return.
194 The present withholding system treats the current period's pay as if it accurately represents
a pro rata portion of the employee's total earnings for the year. In contrast, in a cumulative
withholding system, like the United Kingdom's "pay-as-you-earn" (PAVE) system, employers track
employees' cumulative earnings and adjust withholding in each period to reflect changing circum-
stances. See Kesselman, supra note III, at 226-27; cf James E. Williamson & Francine J. Lip-
man, The New Earned Income Tax Credit: Too Complex For the Targeted Taxpayers?, 57 TAX
NOTES 789, 802-03 (1992) (advocating adoption of a PAVE system for single employees with only
wage income). The city of Milwaukee is considering adopting a system, solely for advance pay-
ment of the EITC, that would incorporate cumulative earnings data. See Stephen D. Holt, Effect
of 1993 Budget Act on the Advance Payment Option of the Earned Income Credit, 62 TAX NOTES
759, 763 (1994)· Another alternative is to adopt rules that improve on both the federal income tax
model and the traditional transfer-program model. For example, Michael Asimow and William
Klein have developed, for purposes of the negative income tax experiments, a system that com-
bines monthly retrospective reporting with an averaging mechanism they call the "carryover sys-
tem." Asimow & Klein, supra note 130, at 10-31. Once again, however, abandoning conformity
with the federal income tax would raise administrative costs and would likely sacrifice other com-
ponent goals of tax-transfer integration.
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which, although large as a transfer program, is small in relation to the
entire income tax system. 195
The most recent amendments to the EITC's advance payment sys-
tem illustrate the intractability of the problem. The 1993 amendments
limit advance payments for all recipients to sixty percent of the EITC
benefit to a family with one child. 196 This change reduces the poten-
tial for overpayments but further restricts the already limited respon-
siveness of the advance payment system. The reduction in
overpayment and later recapture for some families comes at the cost of
reduced responsiveness for others, who must forgo current payment of
a significant portion of their EITC benefit. 197
D. Tax-Transfer Integration and the Trade off Between
Compliance and Participation
Compliance and participation are two important objectives of any
tax or transfer program. Compliance is essential because rules for as-
sessing taxes or awarding benefits based on income or other criteria
are useless unless those rules are enforced. 198 Participation is critical
because income-transfer programs cannot improve the economic situa-
tion of families unless the benefits are claimed. Income tax systems
also typically seek maximum participation in order to spread the tax
burden fairly among taxpayers. Income-transfer programs encounter a
familiar trade off between compliance and participation: efforts to in-
crease compliance can reduce eligible beneficiaries' willingness to come
forward and claim the benefits to which they are entitled.199
195 The total cost of the EITC in fiscal year 1995 is projected to be $21.6 billion. See 1994
GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 678. In contrast, in 1994 the federal income tax raised over $541
billion. See id. at 677.
196 See I.R.C. § 3507(b), (c) (West Supp. 1994).
197 The 1990 amendments also limited advance payments by excluding from the advance pay-
ment system the additional credit amounts for larger families, young children, and purchasers of
health insurance. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ I I I I I(C), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-412 (1990), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 312 , 433-35 (1993) (codified at I.R.C. § 32 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993». EITC recipients could in theory obtain private loans against future EITC re-
ceipts, but obtaining credit may be difficult, given the borrower's low income and the sensitivity
of the EITC to fluctuations in income. Even if private credit were available, the riskiness of the
loans would probably dictate a high interest rate, which might provoke public concern. Cf.
Asimow & Klein, supra note 130, at 8-9 (explaining that private loans could be expensive and
difficult to obtain and that substituting a government credit program "would, after all, be just one
more needs-tested program of a sort"). Commercial tax preparers' '" refund anticipation' loans"
are available only after the annual return is filed. See Jan M. Rosen, Electronic Filing For Tax
Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1990, at 34.
198 Rational policymakers, of course, assume a certain level of noncompliance when designing
a program, but compliance efforts remain necessary to contain compliance within anticipated
boundaries.
199 For example, efforts to verify information about income, employment, and children can
require long and complicated forms and certifications from third parties. In the early 1980s, for
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The EITC encounters a similar trade off. It seems likely to achieve
impressive participation rates, because participation in a tax-based
program appears easier and more attractive than participation in a
traditional welfare program. A tax-based program requires only the
filing of a tax return - recipients need not travel to a welfare office,
wait in line, confront brusque or overworked caseworkers, or register
for work or training programs.200 On the other hand, the poor typi-
cally do not have to file tax returns except to claim the EITC. Ironi-
cally, the traditional tax policy goal of exempting the poor from
income taxation tends to undermine automatic EITC participation.20I
In response, the IRS and a number of private groups have undertaken
community outreach efforts in recent years to spread information
about the EITC.202
Despite potential information failures, available data confirm that
the EITC has relatively high participation rates. A 1993 study by
John Karl Scholz of the University of Wisconsin found that in 1990
the EITC's participation rate was between eighty and eighty-six per-
cent.203 Although Scholz's estimate indicates that in 1990 as many as
example, estimates indicate that efforts to crack down on welfare cheating reduced the welfare
rolls significantly - in part by turning away eligible applicants who could or would not cope
with the complex procedures designed to ensure compliance with eligibility requirements. See,
e.g., BRODKIN, supra note 163, at 44-45; Handler, supra note 18, at 481-82; Michael R. Sosin,
Legal Rights and Welfare Change, 1960-1980, in DANZIGER & WEINBERG, supra note 101, at 260,
276-77.
However, not all compliance efforts necessarily reduce participation, and numerous factors
other than compliance efforts - including, for example, pride or lack of information - may
affect participation rates. Commentators have provided demographic, economic, and other expla-
nations for low participation rates in transfer programs. See, e.g., Richard D. Coe, Nonparticipa...
tion in Welfare Programs by Eligible Households: The Case of the Food Stamp Program, 27 J.
ECON. ISSUES 1035, 1°51 (1983); Thomas P. McDonald & Irving Piliavin, Failure to Participate
in AFDC: Some Correlates and Possible Influences, Soc. WORK RES. & ABSTRACTS, Fall 1984, at
17, 22; Philip K. Robins, A Decade of Declining Welfare Participation: Sorting out the Causes, 8
CONTEMP. POL'y ISSUES 110, 111-12 (1990).
200 See Yin, Scholz, Forman & Mazur, supra note 131, at 252.
201 One of the major goals of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the removal of poor taxpayers
from the income tax rolls. The 1986 Act increased the personal exemption and standard deduc-
tion and indexed them for inflation. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§§ 102-103, 100 Stat. 2085, 2099-103 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 63(C), 151 (1988)); STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986 IS (Comm. Print 1987).
202 For descriptions of recent EITC outreach efforts, consult Adrian Lanzillotti, Service At-
tempts to Inform Low-Income Taxpayers of EIC Benefits, 33 HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS 2255
(1994); and 1993 Welfare Reform Hearings, cited above in note 29, at 13 (statement of Stephen D.
Holt, Acting Director, Congress for a Working America), which describes EITC promotion in
Milwaukee.
203 See Scholz, supra note 62, at 65. Scholz notes, however, that changes in the design of the
EITC since 1990 may cause participation rates to vary from his 1990 estimate. See ide at 72; see
also JOHN K. SCHOLZ, THE PARTICIPATION RATE OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 18
(University of Wisconsin-Madison, Inst. for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 928-90,
1990) (estimating EITC participation rate of 76% in 1988).
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2.1 million eligible taxpayers did not claim the credit,204 the EITC
participation rate is still substantially higher than participation rates in
traditional income-transfer programs.205
Enforcing compliance with EITC rules is more difficult. The
EITC presents two intrinsic problems of compliance and enforcement:
the unusual problem of incentives for income overstatement, and the
disproportionate cost of collecting erroneous overpayments from EITC
recipients. First, existing compliance mechanisms generally attempt to
detect or prevent the understatement of earnings, which is the normal
compliance problem faced by the IRS. The EITC, however, tends to
encourage overstatement of earnings, at least by nonworkers and
workers with earnings in the subsidy range.206 A poor nonworker
with two children, for example, might receive a $3370 EITC simply
by increasing the earned income she reports to $8425.207 The econo-
mist Eugene Steuerle terms the problem of exaggerated earnings the
"superterranean economy" and argues that "[b]luntly stated, the IRS
cannot enforce the EITC as it is currently designed, much less as it
would be expanded in the [1993 legislation].''208
204 See Scholz, supra note 62, at 65.
205 See id. at 71; see also 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 2, at 242 (estimating that, in 1992,
approximately 52.7 % of the elderly poor received SSI); CAROLE TRIPPE & PAT DOYLE, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION RATES: JANUARY 1989 at vii
(1992) (estimating a 59% participation rate for eligible individuals and a 56% participation rate
for eligible households).
206 Overstatement of earnings benefits the recipient only up to total earnings of $8425, because
EITC benefits do not increase as earned income exceeds $8425. See supra p. 541.
207 See supra pp. 541-42 and accompanying table and graph.
208 Gene Steuerle, The IRS Cannot Control the New Superterranean Economy, 59 TAX NOTES
1839, 1839 (1993)·
Gaps in coordination between the tax and transfer systems may allow an EITC recipient to
overstate her earnings in order to maximize her EITC benefit without suffering a reduction in
other income-tested transfer benefits. The Code allows the Internal Revenue Service to share
limited information with welfare agencies. See lR.C. § 6103(l)(7) (1988). State agencies adminis-
tering AFDC, Medicaid, and Food Stamps must operate an "income and eligibility verification
system" (IEVS), which uses IRS income data to assist in determining eligibility for these benefits.
42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(25), 1320b-7(a)(2) (1988). Even if IRS information is inconsistent with income
as reported for welfare purposes, however, the agency may not deny benefits automatically, but
must instead verify the information independently and provide notice and a hearing to the recipi-
ent. See id. § 1320b-7(c). In addition, an IEVS has no impact if the EITC claimant does not
receive public benefits. Eugene Steuerle has argued that taxing transfer payments would be one
way to enhance administrative coordination between the federal income tax system and transfer
programs. See Gene Steuerle, Has the Time Come to Tax Welfare and Other Transfer Payments?,
63 TAX NOTES 1365, 1365 (1994).
The EITC also creates the opportunity for more familiar forms of noncompliance. For exam-
ple, a taxpayer with income in or above the EITC phase-out range could increase her EITC by
understating earnings or other income, or by claiming that nonresident children live with her.
The IRS's usual methods for detecting noncompliance would address these strategies. Some non-
compliance and fraud is relatively easily detected. For example, the IRS's computer matching
program detects amounts reported by employers which employees fail to include on their tax
returns. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX GAP 29-30 (GAO/GGD-94- 12 3, 1994).
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The EITC also presents a second potential problem: collection of
overpayments. EITC noncompliance may result in overpayments that
are large relative to the taxpayers' income but that are small dollar
amounts in absolute terms (no more than $3370 per taxpayer).209 Sev-
eral thousand dollars can be an attractive windfall for an individual
but is a relatively small amount for the IRS to seek to collect from one
person, particularly if investigation and collection require audit rather
than computerized correspondence. The IRS might rationally choose
to focus on higher-return cases,210 particularly given the difficulty of
actually recovering the money from low-income households.
Current estimates of noncompliance in the EITC program are
widely cited but probably flawed. In 1990, Congress received IRS
data showing that ineligible taxpayers received thirty-nine percent of
EITC benefits paid in 1985.211 These data sparked newspaper reports
and congressional concern, but the IRS methodology may have exag-
gerated error rates.212 In response to the EITC's perceived problem of
EITC noncompliance, the 1990 amendments to the EITC took steps to
improve compliance.213 Anecdotal evidence continues to provoke con-
Other underreporting - of self-employment income, for example - is more difficult to detect.
See id. at 15.
209 See supra pp. 541-42 and accompanying table and graph. Total dollar amounts at stake
would be greater in large-scale, coordinated fraud schemes.
210 See, e.g., Fewer People Get Stung by IRS Audits, New IRS Statistics Show, WALL ST. ].,
June 8, 1994, at AI (reporting that the IRS now audits less than one percent of individual tax
returns).
211 See Spencer Rich, For Working Poor, a Tough Program to Figure, WASfI. POST, Aug. 14,
1990, at A19; Spencer Rich, IRS: 40% of Recipients Of Child Aid Ineligible, WASH. POST, June
22, 1990, at Alo.
212 The source of the data was the 1985 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP),
drawn from a comprehensive audit of 50,000 taxpayers conducted every three years. In a TCMP
audit, which occurs several years after the filing of the original return, taxpayers are required to
provide verification for every item claimed. Failure to provide verification results in a determina-
tion that the taxpayer was ineligible for the claimed benefit. Thus, some EITC recipients classi-
fied as ineligible in the TCMP audit may have been eligible but simply could not satisfy the
exacting verification requirements, particularly after the fact. Cf Tim Gray, Child Care Conferees
Aim to Tackle Compliance Problems with EITC, 48 TAX NOTES 259, 260 (1990) (reporting the
response of one critic of reports of noncompliance in the EITC, who characterized the IRS data
as 'soft stuff' and noted that the TCMP counts failure to respond to IRS queries as noncompli-
ance). Liebman and Eissa found that only 13 % of taxpayers with EITC benefits disallowed by
the TCMP in 1988 had adjusted gross incomes outside the EITC eligibility range. See Jeffrey B.
Liebman & Nada Eissa, Noncompliance and the Earned Income Tax Credit: Taxpayer Error or
Taxpayer Fraud?, tbl. 4.6 (Dec. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law
School Library).
213 See Holtzblatt, supra note 131, at 180. EITC errors revealed in the TCMP data were
correlated with mistakes in filing status and dependency claims, see id., and raised the possibility
that many low-income families claimed the EITC if they lived with their children, unaware that
the receipt of significant transfer payments would render them ineligible. The 1990 Act reforms
in the EITC, described in Holtzblatt's article, reflected Congress's intention to simplify eligibility
and verification requirements. See id. at 185. Whether the 1990 reforms are effective in reducing
the EITC error rate can be determined only by data on EITC compliance after 1990.
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cern about noncompliance in the EITC, however.214 In addition, re-
gardless of actual magnitudes of noncompliance and enforcement
problems, a few highly publicized incidents could erode support for the
program.215
Once again, however, the goal of tax-transfer integration may con-
strain policy responses to the trade off between compliance and partic-
ipation. Measures to improve compliance with the EITC may require
special rules that deviate from those of the federal income tax, and the
resulting breach in tax-transfer integration could lower participation.
For example, in 1990, congressional concern about noncompliance in
the EITC led to the adoption of rules intended to simplify eligibility
criteria and improve verification.216 These deviations from the federal
income tax rules meant, however, that filing a tax return was no
longer enough to receive the EITC. Under the 1990 rules, an EITC
claimant must also complete a separate (and somewhat complex)
schedule.217 Some analysts have argued that the 1990 changes should
be repealed because requiring extra information from claimants dis-
courages participation.218
Should the EITC's apparently unconventional balance between
participation and compliance warrant concern? If errors are largely
inadvertent and technical and the ineligible beneficiaries are poor,
noncompliance may be of relatively little concern. Fraudulent claims
and errors that benefit better-off groups would likely provoke greater
concern. But supporters of the EITC's work incentive features might
The reported EITC error rates are much higher than the error rates reported for traditional
transfers. In 1989, for example, the overpayment rate for AFDC was 5.7%, for Food Stamps
7.3%, and for SSI 3.4%. See 1993 GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 1596. Holtzblatt notes that
the TCMP estimates of EITC error rates are "high but not unique" for tax provisions: although
wage and salary income is underreported by only 3.6%, non-wage income is underreported by
35%. Holtzblatt, supra note 131, at 183. However, data on welfare error rates have also been
heavily criticized on methodological grounds and may not be directly comparable to measured
EITC error rates. For critiques of quality control statistics, see BRODKIN, cited above in note 163,
at 41-57; FROM QUALITY CONTROL TO QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN AFDC AND MEDICAID
113-37 (Fredrica D. Kramer ed., 1988); and William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class
in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.]. 1198, 1207-13 (1983).
214 See Patrick Kissane, Tax Credit for Poor Is Widely Abused, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993, at
A18; Ronald Sullivan, Four Charged in Tax Plot for Refunds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1994, at B3.
The IRS has acknowledged the problem of EITC fraud. See Yin, Scholz, Forman & Mazur,
supra note 131, at 249 n.86. For an account of IRS mistakes, see Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS
Mistakenly Sends Checks to Unentitled, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1992, at Dl, which reported that,
in an attempt to insure that eligible taxpayers receive the EITC, the IRS mistakenly sent checks
to taxpayers who deliberately did not claim the EITC because they were not entitled to it.
215 The publication of the 1985 TCMP data, which revealed EITC noncompliance, in 1985
created an uproar that was soothed by congressional enactment of EITC reforms in 1990.
216 See Holtzblatt, supra note 131, at 185.
217 See H.R. REP. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1038 (1990).
218 See Yin, Scholz, Forman & Mazur, supra note 131, at 261-62 (suggesting elimination of
Schedule EIC and slight modification of the tax return in order to increase participation).
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oppose the award of any· benefits to nonworkers, even if they are poor.
Moreover, even technical noncompliance violates the intended terms of
the program and creates inequities between compliant and noncom-
pliant participants. Unfortunately, in the absence of current and more
detailed data, we cannot know which groups are benefitting from
noncompliance.219
Although some policy makers may be willing to accept noncompli-
ance in the EITC as the price of obtaining its advantages, the poten-
tial for noncompliance inherent in a tax-based program is likely to be
a matter of recurring public concern. The strong negative public and
political reaction to EITC error rates reported in 1990220 and more
recent criticisms of EITC fraud 221 suggest that persuading policymak-
ers to accept noncompliance as a cost of tax-based administration may
not be easy.
v. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This Article raises serious questions about the validity of ,the over-
simplified claims made for - and against - the EITC. Claims that
the EITC promotes work and responsibility are exaggerated, but
EITC opponents' attempts to equate the EITC with welfare are
equally unsound. The EITC may have certain advantages as a tax-
based program, including greater accessibility, cheaper administration,
and reduced stigma for recipients. But policy analysts should also
consider the inherent disadvantages of a tax-based program: less accu-
rate targeting, less responsiveness to changing needs, and vulnerability
to noncompliance. Although the magnitude of these costs requires em-
pirical study, they are qualitatively important. Legislation in the 1990S
has transformed the EITC into a major income support program with-
out acknowledging that tax-based administration imposes these poten-
tially significant institutional constraints.
Understanding these trade offs does not require a rejection of the
EITC or tax-based administration. The challenge for EITC advocates
is to strengthen the case for the EITe by acknowledging these limita-
tions and then explaining why the EITC is still worthwhile. A full
evaluation of the appropriate role for the EITC and tax-based admin-
istration in American social welfare policy is beyond the scope of this
Article. Future research could extend the analysis begun here to com-
pare more fully the strengths and weaknesses of the EITC with those
219 Cj Liebman & Eissa, supra note 212, tbl. 4.6 (suggesting that 1988 TCMP data shows that
only 13 % of ineligible EITC claimants had adjusted gross incomes above the EITC income cut-
off). These findings, however, may be outdated in light of the significant changes in the EITC
program since 1988.
220 See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying text.
221 See, e.g., Bovard, supra note 12, at A18 (characterizing the EITC as a "gravy train for con
artists").
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of existing alternative institutions and potential new programs - for
example, family allowances or wage subsidies - each of which might
be tax-based or administered through traditional expenditure
programs.
Empirical studies could provide crucial evidence about the practi-
cal importance of the institutional constraints facing the EITC and
other tax-based programs both in absolute terms and relative to ex-
isting welfare programs or other alternative policies. They might, in
addition, provide aggregate measures for comparing programs, which
would facilitate evaluation of, for example, the relative inaccuracy of
the EITC attributable to mismeasurement of income and the family
unit and to noncompliance. Ideal data also would reveal how sensitive
these institutional limitations are to changes in the size and design of
the program.222 Unfortunately, good data on the current EITC pro-
gram are likely to be scarce until the middle or late 1990S.223 In the
meantime, policymakers will have to rely on anecdotal evidence and a
priori analysis, both of which suggest that the EITC should not be
overutilized.
Additional studies of EITC administration may reveal other impor-
tant considerations in evaluating and designing tax-based transfer pro-
grams. For example, if commercial tax preparers play a significant
role as intermediaries between EITC recipients and the government,224
policy analysts should investigate the performance of these privately
paid EITC "case workers." The cost of return preparation, although
paid by EITC recipients, is properly viewed as a hidden administra-
tive cost of the EITC program. Perhaps these preparers offer a pro-
ductive way to use private markets to improve social service delivery,
but the fees they charge in effect reduce net EITC benefits received.
Expanding free return-preparation services and educating EITC recip-
ients to prepare their own returns may be an appropriate policy
response.
A more sophisticated approach to tax-transfer integration would
acknowledge the shortcomings of tax-based transfer programs and
would attempt to create alternative institutions that incorporate the
222 This description is, of course, a lawyer's wish-list and not a pragmatic research proposal.
Limitations on data and research design may well constrain the empirical information that can
realistically be collected.
223 Data collected before 1991 reflect the characteristics of a much smaller program. See supra
note 203 and accompanying text. Data collected between 1991 and 1993 will reflect a somewhat
larger program but may be distorted by the transition to new eligibility rules enacted in 1990, see
supra note 213 and accompanying text, and the complex "supplemental" credits enacted in 1990
and repealed in 1993, see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13131, 107 Stat. 312, 433-35 (1993) (codified at I.R.C. § 32 (Supp. V 1993»; I.R.C. §32(b)(I)(D),
(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Post-1993 data will be more reliable, but the exp~nded program will not be
fully phased in until calendar year 1996. See I.R.C. §32(a).
224 See supra note 123.
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best features of tax and welfare administration and are stronger than
either standing alone. For example, traditional administrative struc-
tures could conceivably implement at least some of the desirable re-
forms embodied by the EITC.225 Other possible avenues for progress
include improved information-sharing between the tax system and
transfer programs or greater coordination of facilities and personnel.226
A few states have begun to experiment with such administrative
coordination.227
My own long-term project has two principal goals. First, it will
expand the analysis begun in this Article to consider comparative in-
stitutional features of a wider variety of redistributive programs. For
example, this Article focuses primarily on programs that tailor benefits
explicitly to economic need. One additional issue is how the trade offs
identified here change in the context of non-income-tested programs,
which appear to differ significantly in their political appeal, revenue
cost, distributional patterns and efficiency costs. Second, it will seek to
develop a normative framework for evaluating different redistributive
programs - attempting to identify the norms that should guide us in
evaluating social welfare policy and determining how to strike a bal-
ance among competing policy goals. A central issue for the project
remains the extent to which tax-based programs and tax policy can
play a productive role in social welfare policy.
My next Article will consider current "family policy" proposals.
For many years, commentators have argued that the United States,
like many Western European countries, should fund an array of gov-
ernment programs to redistribute resources to families. These propos-
als typically include income transfers and public financing for child
care. In recent years, American policy analysts have called for family
allowances,228 child support assurance programs,229 and'increased gov-
225 For example, negative income tax plans typically sought to adopt many of the legal struc-
tures and procedures of the federal income tax, but there was no consensus on whether they
should actually be administered through the federal income tax system. See GREEN, supra note 6,
at 111-12, 166-68; SURREY, supra note 97, at 312-13.
226 The Clinton administration's welfare reform bill permits several demonstration projects in
which states may administer EITC advance payments through the welfare system. See S. 2224,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 741, reprinted in 140 CONGo REC. 57312-13 (daily ed. June 21, 1994).
227 For example, Michigan has applied for a waiver for a welfare demonstration that would
administer EITC advance payments through the AFDC and food stamp delivery system. See
Scholz, supra note 105, at I, 7-8. Minnesota is studying the possibility of integrating its tax-credit
and traditional transfer programs by using the transfer system. See Wilson & Cline, supra note
155, at 670-75.
228 See, e.g., Yin, Scholz, Forman & Mazur, supra note 131, at 283-86 (proposing a similar
"family allowance benefit"); George K. Yin & Jonathan B. Forman, Redesigning the Earned In-
come Tax Credit Program to Provide More Effective Assistance to the Working Poor, 59 TAX
NOTES 95 I, 959-60 (1993) (suggesting a refundable tax credit based on family size).
229 See, e.g., IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT 47-56 (1992) (suggesting that the
government pay child support if support from nonresident parents is inadequate); HAVEMAN,
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ernment aid for child care.230 Traditional scholarship on taxation of
the family focuses primarily on the rules governing the tax liability of
married couples and the adjustment of tax liability for family size.231
My project will move beyond these topics to consider whether tax-
based programs and the tax system's administrative structure can use-
fully further the goals of social welfare and family policy.
supra note 122, at 163-65 (suggesting that public transfers should make up the difference between
an absent parent's support and a set minimum level). The Clinton administration's welfare re-
form bill contains a child support assurance demonstration project. See 5. 2224, 103d Cong., 2d
5ess. § 681, reprinted in 140 CONGo REC. 57304-05 (daily ed. June 21, 1994); 140 CONGo REC.
57348-62 (describing proposed child support assurance measures).
230 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NE\V AMERICAN
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 65-79 (1991) (advocating governmental support for child
care programs).
231 See, e.g., Gann, supra note 108, at 3-4 (arguing that it is more equitable to tax married
individuals separately than jointly); McCaffery, supra note 104, at 987-88 (arguing that the taxa-
tion of married couples helps perpetuate traditional gender roles).
